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This paper develops a set of Lanchester-type equations modeling small-force guerrilla engagements that are typical of the early stages of insurgency. These equations include the effects of supporting weapons and the discipline or morale of the troops involved. The novelty of this treatment from the mathematical point of view is the use of time-dependent weapon-efficiency coefficients. Although the models and theory are not adequate to predict the outcome of an insurgency, they should prove useful for examining the credibility of casualty claims associated with such conflict. In addition, the models provide useful insight regarding the important attack parameters of guerrilla warfare. In some cases, notably those concerning ambushes, the theory suggests new military hardware that in the past has been difficult to justify on analytical grounds.

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PurposeRussian dominance of the Eurasian natural gas delivery system has put the independence of the EU's foreign policy at risk. Although Europe is struggling to counteract the threat, Russia appears to be winning the game. This paper aims to recommend significant measures to reverse the trend.Design/methodology/approachThis is a discussion paper exploring the issues involved.FindingsRussia's stranglehold already has acquired 25 percent of the European market. Moreover, it is installing four new pipelines, and plans to increase its market share substantially. In response, Europe is building or planning three new pipelines. The author recommends additionally: strategic gas reserves, anti‐trust prosecution, financial and political inducements, and offering WTO membership to Russia in exchange for concessions.Practical implicationsEurope can win the great natural gas pipeline game if it is played with commitment. Europe must focus on the big prize, natural gas independence.Originality/valueThis original research viewpoint contains suggestions for the EU and Europe to increase their energy security.

The insurgency warfare being practiced by global terrorists in the 21st Century is put in a historical context and modeled mathematically. The most widely known insurgency model is the “fish in the sea” formulation attributed to Mao Tse-tung. Fundamentally, it is a phased attrition model that can be described by variations of the Lanchester equations. In a collective sense, much of the Vietnam War fits that formulation. However, the 21st Century has featured a different type of insurgency where attrition is not the decisive factor on either side. Today's insurgencies are psychological wars of political endurance, not attrition. They require different mathematics. The mathematical formulation of 21st Century counterinsurgency warfare contains two stochastic time series, the first dealing with defeat and the second success. The defeat portion deals with the likelihood of precipitous troop withdrawals permitting terrorist insurgents to declare victory in a de facto sense. The defeat probability roughly mirrors public opinion polls. Public opinion polls are probabilistic because they are heavily influenced by short-term unpredictable events, some detrimental to the war effort and some supporting it. In a sense, this is similar to the fluctuations of the stock market or exchange rate variations. They are also influenced by the duration of the war and accumulated casualties, both in a negative sense. Consequently, the defeat probability trends upward asymptotically toward unity over time although the instantaneous values cluster above and below the trend curve. In a democracy, decision makers or funding bodies can resist adverse polls but not indefinitely. If war support polls are heavily negative, it is probable that decision makers will eventually move to cut their losses and pull out. The second portion of the model independently deals with success by counterinsurgency forces; i.e., a level of stability and security that permits at least a partial, phased troop draw down. It is based on estimates of the strength and quality of the host country military and police forces, the level of insurgent-initiated violence, the state of the host country economy, the services provided by the host government, and the willingness of the host government to address the insurgency in an even-handed manner. The success model resembles the Hamlet Evaluation System used during the Vietnam War. The instantaneous measures of success fluctuate above and below the trend curve with a variance that can be small, approaching determinacy. The success model has fixed, predetermined benchmarks that can but may not be achieved depending on the level of effort relative to the insurgent opposition. Both parts of the model deal with counterinsurgent troop withdrawals, one precipitous and one gradual and phased. In neither of the cases considered, de facto defeat or phased withdrawal, does the model deal with “military” defeat or victory. If the type of insurgencies encountered in the 21st Century become the norm, military defeat and victory are irrelevant.

This analysis develops and predicts a politically controversial idea, namely that nuclear fission power will be the dominant energy resource of the 21st century. Abundant energy enables higher and more efficient utilization of resources. Energy drives the engines of industrial and food production, transportation, building construction, space heating, transformation of landscapes, recreation, etc. This article compares other energy alternatives with the potential of nuclear fission power. It predicts that several hundred nuclear plants, each nominally of 10 gigawatts capacity, could supply the world’s energy requirements without creation of polluting greenhouse gases. Moreover, the superabundance of power this would represent could feed the world, supply its drinking water, and raise the per capita income and standard of living to levels where total human population would level off at an acceptable number. However, realization of such benefits requires unprecedented world cooperation, and these issues are also treated in this article.