Lanchester Models of Guerrilla Engagements

Schaffer, Marvin Baker

doi:10.1287/opre.16.3.457

Cited by 39 publications

(25 citation statements)

References 2 publications

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“…Lanchester models have been used in the past to describe guerrilla warfare. Deitchman (1962) presented the first such model, which was followed by Schaffer (1968). The engagement dynamics in these papers are asymmetric and involve a mixture of precise (aimed) and imprecise (area) fire: Guerrillas can observe the movement and location of government forces and engage with aimed fire, whereas government forces have limited situational awareness and therefore engage with area fire.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Confronting Entrenched Insurgents

Kaplan

Kress

Szechtman

2010

Operations Research

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During counterinsurgency operations, government forces with superior firepower confront weaker low-signature insurgents. Under what conditions should government (Blue) forces attack insurgent (Red) strongholds? How should the government allocate its force across different strongholds when the insurgents' threat to the Blue civilian population must be taken into account? How should the government respond to "smart" insurgents who anticipate the government's optimal plan of attack and prepare accordingly? How do the results change when the government takes Red civilian casualties resulting from attacks on insurgent strongholds into account? This article addresses these questions. Using Lanchester models modified to account for imperfect intelligence, we formulate an optimal force allocation problem for the government and develop a knapsack approximation that has tight error bounds. We also model a sequential force allocation game between the insurgents and the government and solve for its equilibrium. When the government has perfect intelligence, in equilibrium the insurgents concentrate their force in a single stronghold that the government either attacks or not depending upon the resulting casualty count. Otherwise, under reasonable assumptions regarding the government's behavior and intelligence capabilities, it is optimal for the insurgents to "spread out" in a way that maximizes the number of soldiers required to win all battles. If the government worries about Red civilian casualties, the insurgents have a strong incentive to blend in with the Red civilian population, because this can prevent government attacks while allowing the insurgents to inflict casualties on Blue civilians. Such strategic behavior makes it harder for the government to protect its citizens from insurgent attacks.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Confronting Entrenched Insurgents

Kaplan

Kress

Szechtman

2010

Operations Research

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“…Deitchman's model was extended in [13], [14] and [15]. Absent accurate situational awareness, that is, information regarding the whereabouts of the insurgency targets, not only might the guerrillas be able to continue their insurgency actions unhindered, but collateral damage caused to civilians from poor targeting by the government forces may generate an adverse response against the government, thus creating popular support for the insurgents [16].…”

Section: T Pmentioning

confidence: 99%

Analytic Modeling of Insurgencies

Kress¹

2014

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Legacy force-on-force models are symmetrical; they reflect the fact that the dynamics of both sides in the conflict is governed by similar rules. These models have also traditionally focused on the physical aspects of armed conflicts -fire, attrition, detection, movement, logistics, etc. Insurgency models are different in two key aspects: (a) they are asymmetrical and (b) they contain, in addition to the physical aspects, significant cognitive, social, cultural, political and economic factors. The reason for the asymmetry is the way insurgents evolve and operate, and the emergence of non-physical factors is due to the major role of civilians in such conflicts. This article focuses on analytic modeling of insurgencies and counterinsurgency operations, describing both the physical and non-physical components of such armed conflicts.

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“…The closest relevant work is the dynamic guerrilla warfare model introduced by Deitchman (1962) and followed by Schaffer (1968). Both papers are based on classical Lanchester equations (Lanchester 1916).…”

Section: ) Statesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Why Defeating Insurgencies Is Hard: The Effect of Intelligence in Counterinsurgency Operations—A Best-Case Scenario

Kress

Szechtman

2009

Operations Research

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In insurgency situations, the government-organized force is confronted by a small guerrilla group that is dispersed in the general population with no or a very small signature. Effective counterinsurgency operations require good intelligence. Absent intelligence, not only might the insurgents escape unharmed and continue their violent actions, but collateral damage caused to the general population from poor targeting may generate adverse response against the government and create popular support for the insurgents, which may result in higher recruitment to the insurgency. We model the dynamic relations among intelligence, collateral casualties in the population, attrition, recruitment to the insurgency, and reinforcement to the government force. Even under best-case assumptions, we show that the government cannot totally eradicate the insurgency by force. The best it can do is contain it at a certain fixed level.

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Lanchester Models of Guerrilla Engagements

Cited by 39 publications

References 2 publications

Confronting Entrenched Insurgents

Confronting Entrenched Insurgents

Analytic Modeling of Insurgencies

Why Defeating Insurgencies Is Hard: The Effect of Intelligence in Counterinsurgency Operations—A Best-Case Scenario

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