The gender pay gap generates significant political and social debate. This study contributes to this discussion by examining if a gender pay gap exists at the highest level of corporate management, the CEOs. While previous studies have documented a gender pay gap for most levels of executives the findings with respect to CEOs are conflicting. In this paper we focus only on CEO's as it is the most homogenous of executive roles and does not require us to assume that executives with similar titles undertake identical roles. Our evidence is based on 291 US firm-years for the period of 1998-2010. We do not find any association between CEO pay and gender using both the total sample and a sample matched using propensity scores to control for firm characteristics. These insignificant results hold for total pay, salary and bonuses, and for different matching procedures and econometric specifications. Our results therefore indicate that women who rise through the "glass ceiling" to the level of CEO are remunerated at similar levels to their male counterparts.

We examine the association between gender-diverse compensation committees and CEO pay and find that CEO compensation levels are negatively associated with gender-diversity of the compensation committee, but not gender-diversity of the board. Furthermore, we find that excess CEO compensation is negatively related to subsequent return on assets for firms with an all-male compensation committee but not for firms with a gender-diverse compensation committee. These results suggest that CEOs do receive some level of excess compensation which can be mitigated by having one or more females on the compensation committee.Keywords: Gender-diversity, compensation committee, CEO compensation 2 INTRODUCTIONThere is a global trend by policy makers and regulators to increase women on boards.Some European countries including Norway, Spain and France have sought to implement gender quotas, others use networking and mentoring programmes to quicken women's rise to the top. 1 The academic community has responded to this global trend by providing evidence on the differences between male and female directors, and/or the effect of gender-diversity on different corporate decisions. We build on this literature by investigating the economic consequences of gender-diversity in the context of CEO compensation. Specifically, our objectives are to provide evidence on: (i) the association between gender-diverse compensation committees and levels of CEO compensation, and (ii) the effect of genderdiverse compensation committees on the association between firm performance and 'excess' CEO compensation. 2This study contributes to the current debate on executive compensation levels and structures. Executive compensation levels have undergone renewed scrutiny following the global financial crisis and are criticised for encouraging excessive risk taking. 3 As a result, legislation has been proposed or enacted which restricts the level and proportion of the components of executive pay. 4 This study contributes to these professional debates by providing evidence on the association between firms with a gender-diverse compensation 1 Norway maintains a mandatory gender quota of 40%, Spain of 40% by 2015, and France is to introduce 50% by 2015. More recently, the European commission is seeking to implement a 40% female-quota for company boards across Europe, which is being opposed by eight countries including Britain, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Malta (Traynor 2012).2 'Excess' compensation is compensation above what can be explained by economic determinants (e.g. Core,Guay and Larcker

Accounting standard setters have increasingly attempted to align external segment reporting disclosures to a firm's internal reporting structure. We study how this move to the management approach for segment reporting impacted the number of reported segments and the extent of line item disclosures when Australia adopted IAS 14 (revised) and IFRS 8. We find that both standards led to firms disclosing a greater number of segments. An examination of the motives behind the non‐disclosure of segments suggests that segment information was withheld for agency cost reasons. We find only limited support for the proprietary cost motive for non‐reporting of segments. We also document that IFRS 8 led to a reduction in the amount of line item disclosure. Consistent with a proprietary cost explanation, the decrease in disclosure is greatest for firms with a higher number of profitable segments. Our results indicate that the change to the management approach to segment identification is not associated with the properties of analyst forecasts, nor did it lead to increased analyst following.

This study presents empirical evidence on cost stickiness using a large sample of Australian listed firms from 1990–2010. We find cost behaviour in Australian firms is sticky on average, with a lower degree of stickiness than in United States firms. Costs increase by 0.885% with a 1% increase in sales revenues, but decrease by only 0.797% for a 1% decrease in sales. The degree of cost stickiness demonstrates a ‘U’ shape over the period and increases after the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards. Sticky cost behaviour, however, is not evidenced in the resources, construction and retail industries. We document evidence consistent with the argument of adjustment costs of employed resources, managerial incentives and agency costs. The degree of cost stickiness in Australia increases with a firm's asset and employee intensity, and when managers have strong incentives to avoid decreases in earnings or losses, but is less pronounced when revenues decline in the preceding period and in firms with strong governance mechanisms. Our results provide important implications for external stakeholders’ understanding of firm performance.

Although previous research has generally found that goodwill reported in firms' financial reports is relevant to equity valuation, no known studies have directly examined whether the value-relevance of purchased goodwill holds as it ages. We examine this issue in the Australian context to determine whether the market attaches different values to the components of Australian firms' goodwill when it is disaggregated into different 'ages'. Our results suggest that recently acquired goodwill has information content whereas 'older' goodwill does not. Our findings have implications for goodwill accounting practice and recent changes to goodwill accounting standards. Copyright (c) The Authors Journal compilation (c) 2006 AFAANZ.

This study examines the economic and director-specific determinants of nonexecutive director (NED) compensation in the Australian setting. We find that NED compensation is associated with firm size, complexity, growth, risk and liquidity. It is also associated with director reputation, experience, connectedness and the directors' involvement with the firm. The additional compensation paid to the chairperson is positively associated with their prior experience and negatively associated with NED reputation and involvement. We find inconclusive evidence on the association between changes in NED compensation and firm performance.

While a considerable amount of research in Australia, the United States and elsewhere shows that takeovers create value for target shareholders, there is relatively little research investigating the explanations for cross‐sectional differences in the size of the premium paid to target shareholders. This paper tests various arguments proposed to explain some of the sources of this premium. One such explanation is the removal of inefficient target management. Takeovers have been recognised as a mechanism that allows management teams to compete for the right to manage corporate assets. We test the associations between bidder and target managerial ownership (proxied by director's holdings), the prior performance of the bidder and target and the size of the premium paid to target shareholders. Other potential influences on the premium include a reduction in the agency costs of free cash flow and the provision of financial slack or reserve borrowing capacity to the target firm by the bidder. Using a sample of seventy‐eight Australian takeovers occurring between 1981 and 1989 our tests indicate that the provision of financial slack to the target is associated with a significantly higher premium, while high bidder ownership results in a significantly lower premium. The premium is found to be positively related to the performance of the bidder in the period prior to the bid. The tests disclose an association between the agency costs of free cash flow and the target premium which is inconsistent with the theory, and reveal only weak evidence that the takeover premium is higher when inefficient target management is removed.

This study examines factors that explain the turnover and board seats held by target firm directors post-takeover. Following successful takeovers the proportion of the board replaced is lower when the target has better performance. In failed takeovers, executive directors have lower turnover and the rate of turnover is reduced after a hostile takeover. Inconsistent with ex-post settling-up, actions that advance target shareholder wealth during the takeover does not assist a director obtain an increase in future board seats. Confirming a reputation effect, directors with multiple directorships have a lower rate of turnover and a higher increase in future board seats.