The gender pay gap generates significant political and social debate. This study contributes to this discussion by examining if a gender pay gap exists at the highest level of corporate management, the CEOs. While previous studies have documented a gender pay gap for most levels of executives the findings with respect to CEOs are conflicting. In this paper we focus only on CEO's as it is the most homogenous of executive roles and does not require us to assume that executives with similar titles undertake identical roles. Our evidence is based on 291 US firm-years for the period of 1998-2010. We do not find any association between CEO pay and gender using both the total sample and a sample matched using propensity scores to control for firm characteristics. These insignificant results hold for total pay, salary and bonuses, and for different matching procedures and econometric specifications. Our results therefore indicate that women who rise through the "glass ceiling" to the level of CEO are remunerated at similar levels to their male counterparts.

We examine the association between gender-diverse compensation committees and CEO pay and find that CEO compensation levels are negatively associated with gender-diversity of the compensation committee, but not gender-diversity of the board. Furthermore, we find that excess CEO compensation is negatively related to subsequent return on assets for firms with an all-male compensation committee but not for firms with a gender-diverse compensation committee. These results suggest that CEOs do receive some level of excess compensation which can be mitigated by having one or more females on the compensation committee.Keywords: Gender-diversity, compensation committee, CEO compensation 2 INTRODUCTIONThere is a global trend by policy makers and regulators to increase women on boards.Some European countries including Norway, Spain and France have sought to implement gender quotas, others use networking and mentoring programmes to quicken women's rise to the top. 1 The academic community has responded to this global trend by providing evidence on the differences between male and female directors, and/or the effect of gender-diversity on different corporate decisions. We build on this literature by investigating the economic consequences of gender-diversity in the context of CEO compensation. Specifically, our objectives are to provide evidence on: (i) the association between gender-diverse compensation committees and levels of CEO compensation, and (ii) the effect of genderdiverse compensation committees on the association between firm performance and 'excess' CEO compensation. 2This study contributes to the current debate on executive compensation levels and structures. Executive compensation levels have undergone renewed scrutiny following the global financial crisis and are criticised for encouraging excessive risk taking. 3 As a result, legislation has been proposed or enacted which restricts the level and proportion of the components of executive pay. 4 This study contributes to these professional debates by providing evidence on the association between firms with a gender-diverse compensation 1 Norway maintains a mandatory gender quota of 40%, Spain of 40% by 2015, and France is to introduce 50% by 2015. More recently, the European commission is seeking to implement a 40% female-quota for company boards across Europe, which is being opposed by eight countries including Britain, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Malta (Traynor 2012).2 'Excess' compensation is compensation above what can be explained by economic determinants (e.g. Core,Guay and Larcker

We examine the association between various takeover outcomes and bidding firm nonexecutive director (NEDs) compensation and expertise in the target firm industry. In our sample of 272 acquisitions by ASX listed firms between 2004-2011, we find that NEDs' relative compensation and industry expertise have a negative association with the bid premium. We also find that NEDs' relative compensation is positively associated with the bidding firm's market reaction to the takeover announcement, and NEDs' industry expertise is associated with a lower likelihood of an increase in the offer price, particularly for M&As viewed negatively by the market. These results are consistent with higher NEDs' relative compensation and industry expertise leading to more effective board monitoring and advising.

We investigate whether qualified and experienced directors are willing to join firms following the revelation of financial fraud. Specifically, we focus on directors with prior board experience and accounting and legal experts. We find that, notwithstanding the tarnished reputation of fraudulent firms and a higher workload, qualified and experienced directors join the boards of such firms. Subsequent to joining fraudulent firms, directors are rewarded with additional future board seats and benefit from higher compensation. We rule out alternative explanations and verify the robustness of the results by performing a variety of tests, including propensity score matching and difference-in-differences analysis. JEL Classifications: G30; G34.

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