We recorded neurons from the hippocampus of freely behaving rats during an auditory fear conditioning task. Rats received either paired or unpaired presentations of an auditory conditioned stimulus (CS) and an electric shock unconditioned stimulus (US). Hippocampal neurons (place and theta cells) acquired responses to the auditory CS in the paired but not in the unpaired group. After CS-US pairing, rhythmic firing of theta cells became synchronized to the onset of the CS. Conditioned responses of place cells were gated by their location-specific firing, so that after CS-US pairing, place cells responded to the CS only when the rat was within the cell's place field. These findings may help to elucidate how the hippocampus contributes to context-specific memory formation during associative learning.

The study of the neural basis of emotional empathy has received a surge of interest in recent years but mostly employing human neuroimaging. A simpler animal model would pave the way for systematic single cell recordings and invasive manipulations of the brain regions implicated in empathy. Recent evidence has been put forward for the existence of empathy in rodents. In this study, we describe a potential model of empathy in female rats, in which we studied interactions between two rats: a witness observes a demonstrator experiencing a series of footshocks. By comparing the reaction of witnesses with or without previous footshock experience, we examine the role of prior experience as a modulator of empathy. We show that witnesses having previously experienced footshocks, but not naïve ones, display vicarious freezing behavior upon witnessing a cage-mate experiencing footshocks. Strikingly, the demonstrator's behavior was in turn modulated by the behavior of the witness: demonstrators froze more following footshocks if their witness froze more. Previous experiments have shown that rats emit ultrasonic vocalizations (USVs) when receiving footshocks. Thus, the role of USV in triggering vicarious freezing in our paradigm is examined. We found that experienced witness-demonstrator pairs emitted more USVs than naïve witness-demonstrator pairs, but the number of USVs was correlated with freezing in demonstrators, not in witnesses. Furthermore, playing back the USVs, recorded from witness-demonstrator pairs during the empathy test, did not induce vicarious freezing behavior in experienced witnesses. Thus, our findings confirm that vicarious freezing can be triggered in rats, and moreover it can be modulated by prior experience. Additionally, our result suggests that vicarious freezing is not triggered by USVs per se and it influences back onto the behavior of the demonstrator that had elicited the vicarious freezing in witnesses, introducing a paradigm to study empathy as a social loop.

We recorded hippocampal place cells in two spatial environments: a training environment in which rats underwent fear conditioning and a neutral control environment. Fear conditioning caused many place cells to alter (or remap) their preferred firing locations in the training environment, whereas most cells remained stable in the control environment. This finding indicates that aversive reinforcement can induce place cell remapping even when the environment itself remains unchanged. Furthermore, contextual fear conditioning caused significantly more remapping of place cells than auditory fear conditioning, suggesting that place cell remapping was related to the rat's learned fear of the environment. These results suggest that one possible function of place cell remapping may be to generate new spatial representations of a single environment, which could help the animal to discriminate among different motivational contexts within that environment.

No abstract

The most fundamental choice an animal has to make when it detects a threat is whether to freeze, reducing its chances of being noticed, or to flee to safety. Here we show that Drosophila melanogaster exposed to looming stimuli in a confined arena either freeze or flee. The probability of freezing versus fleeing is modulated by the fly’s walking speed at the time of threat, demonstrating that freeze/flee decisions depend on behavioral state. We describe a pair of descending neurons crucially implicated in freezing. Genetic silencing of DNp09 descending neurons disrupts freezing yet does not prevent fleeing. Optogenetic activation of both DNp09 neurons induces running and freezing in a state-dependent manner. Our findings establish walking speed as a key factor in defensive response choices and reveal a pair of descending neurons as a critical component in the circuitry mediating selection and execution of freezing or fleeing behaviors.

Animals often are prosocial, displaying behaviors that result in a benefit to one another [1-15] even in the absence of self-benefit [16-21] (but see [22-25]). Several factors have been proposed to modulate these behaviors, namely familiarity [6, 13, 18, 20] or display of seeking behavior [16, 21]. Rats have been recently shown to be prosocial under distress [17, 18] (but see [26-29]); however, what drives prosociality in these animals remains unclear. To address this issue, we developed a two-choice task in which prosocial behavior did not yield a benefit or a cost to the focal rat. We used a double T-maze in which only the focal rat controlled access to the food-baited arms of its own and the recipient rat's maze. In this task, the focal rat could choose between one side of the maze, which yielded food only to itself (selfish choice), and the opposite side, which yielded food to itself and the recipient rat (prosocial choice). Rats showed a high proportion of prosocial choices. By manipulating reward delivery to the recipient and its ability to display a preference for the baited arm, we found that the display of food-seeking behavior leading to reward was necessary to drive prosocial choices. In addition, we found that there was more social investigation between rats in selfish trials than in prosocial trials, which may have influenced the focals' choices. This study shows that rats provide access to food to others in the absence of added direct self-benefit, bringing new insights into the factors that drive prosociality.

No abstract

No abstract