The aim of the study was to investigate the process of desistance from sexual crime by comparing two groups of child molesters: One group was deemed to be desisting, while men in the other group were deemed as being still potentially active offenders. Men in the desisting group reported being optimistic for the future, reported an enhanced sense of personal agency and a more internalized locus of control, and identified treatment as being a turning point in their lives. In comparison, men in the active group were found to be more pessimistic and were more likely to blame external events, or situations, for their problems. One of the most striking findings of the research was that the desisting group had found a place within a social group or network, unlike the still potentially active offenders who all described a life of social isolation and alienation.

The literature on desistance from crime has become well established in recent years with strong bodies of evidence supporting the role of factors such as employment, relationships and identity change in this process. However, the relevance of this literature to individuals convicted of sexual crimes is not known as such individuals are almost always excluded from this research. This article presents the results from one of the first empirical studies on desistance from sexual offending based on 32 in-depth life story interviews with adult males previously convicted of child sex offences. In this analysis we explore the significance of work, the role of relationships, and changes in imagined selves in the self-identities of individuals successfully desisting from sexual offending. The findings provide support for all three factors in helping to sustain desistance from sex offending, but also suggest clear differences between desistance from sex offending and other types of crime in these regards.

Although there is a substantial body of work on desistance from crime in general, comparatively little is known about desistance from sexual crime. The broad aim of this paper is to provide an overview of the research methodology and preliminary findings from a recent empirical study on desistance from sexual offending conducted by the authors.1 Such findings have potentially important implications for policy and practice concerning sex offender risk assessment, treatment and management.

This study examines how firm performance influences CEO pay in U.K. public listed companies. Specifically, it explores evidence of relative performance evaluation, following the recommendation in the U.K. Combined Code on Corporate Governance to link executive pay to relative firm performance. Using a panel of CEOs drawn from 204 of the largest, nonfinancial U.K. companies, between 2003 and 2007, we provide new and convincing evidence that shows basic pay and annual bonus is determined relative to annual FTSE 350 market performance and long-term incentive payouts are determined relative to 3-year FTSE 350 industry sector performance. Our results provide robust evidence that is consistent with the principal-agent framework of executive pay and firm performance. We demonstrate that it is crucial for research to distinguish between the different elements of pay and the different performance conditions that attach to those elements in order to establish a comprehensive understanding of the pay-for-performance relationship. The study provides confirmation that remuneration committees consider own firm performance relative to peer group performance in setting up CEO compensation contracts. We conclude that changes introduced to improve corporate governance practice in the field of executive pay are working to the benefit of shareholders.

Sex offending is typically understood from a pathology

Despite substantial corporate governance and regulatory reform on both sides of the Atlantic, which started over two decades ago, executive pay remains an unresolved problem. Twenty years since the publication of the groundbreaking Cadbury Report, criticism of executive pay is more severe than ever before in the United Kingdom. The relationship between pay and performance is still highly questionable, and executive remuneration continues to vastly exceed and outpace average employee pay. In this article, we discuss and evaluate the U.K. coalition government's attempts to influence practice, through the Hutton Review of Fair Pay and the latest revised U.K. remuneration reporting regulations. Although we welcome these changes, it is our view that regulation can only go so far in addressing executive pay and in creating a wider perception of fairness. Ultimately, individual remuneration committees must focus far more on managing internal relativities rather than on the external executive pay market, which as well as improving external perceptions is also more likely to increase levels of employee engagement and performance.

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