Populism is usually studied by looking at the electoral and rhetorical strategies of parties considered to be populist. In contrast, this article attempts to measure the support for the core propositions of populism among voters and explain the social differences in that support. On the basis of a survey of the Dutch-speaking population of Belgium (N: 2,330) we find that this support for populism turns out not to be directly influenced by a weak or uncertain economic position, by dissatisfaction with personal life or feelings of anomie. Support for populism appears foremost as a consequence of a very negative view of the evolution of society -declinism -and of the feeling of belonging to a group of people that is unfairly treated by society.

This article investigates to what degree the standardized life cycle has been replaced by an individualized life course, characterized by the absence of a strict sequence and timing of life's transitions. In order to measure the normative position of people, rather than the external conditions to which they are subject, the test is based on the ideal life course or life cycle as described by a purely random sample of 4666 inhabitants of Belgium, aged 18 to 36. The available evidence overwhelmingly points towards the persistence of a standardized ideal life cycle, characterized by a strict sequence and timing of the important transitions

In explanations offered for fear of crime, two different paradigms can be distinguished. The first considers fear of crime as a rational reaction to crime and victimization; the other views such fear as a representation of more general feelings of malaise. The paradigms suggest different research strategies and offer different explanations for the same empirical observations. The choice of paradigm therefore determines the meaning of the empirical findings and hence the policy implications that can be drawn from them. In this article, the authors describe the paradigms, illustrate the way in which they offer different explanations for the same observations, and try to empirically discriminate between them on the basis of crucial tests. The tests are performed on data for the Flemish (Belgian) population aged nineteen to thirty-six. The results support the view that fear of crime or feelings of insecurity should be seen mainly as a consequence of, on one hand, general feelings of malaise, vulnerability, and helplessness that can have many origins and, on the other hand, exposure to processes of communication that highlight crime and the risk of victimization.

This article tests the claim that anti-Muslim feelings are more widespread than general anti-foreigner feelings. It reports on two split sample experiments, in which a randomly selected part of the respondents evaluated statements for which the target group was identified as 'foreigners' and the other part evaluated the identical statements but with the target group identified as 'Muslims'. By using open-ended questions we are able to separate those respondents who had Muslims in mind when asked about foreigners from those who did not. We find that anti-Muslim feelings are more intense than anti-foreigner feelings along a wide range of attitude dimensions. Furthermore, those respondents who had Muslims in mind while judging statements about foreigners, turned out to be at least as hostile as those who were asked explicitly about Muslims.

Using cross-sectional and panel data, this article estimates to what extent the association between students' choice of academic discipline and their sociopolitical attitudes is due to socialization and selection effects. Copyright (c) 2009 by the Southwestern Social Science Association.

This paper deals with the often-observed complex relationship between the so-called old, ‘economic’ left/right alignment (egalitarianism) and the new, ‘cultural’ alignment. Many authors have observed that the less educated members of society occupy an apparently contradictory position, combining a leftist stand in favor of more equality and government intervention, with a rightist stand on minority rights, the treatment of criminals, and other aspects of democratic citizenship. Various explanations have been offered for this paradox. This paper proposes an explanation in terms of vulnerability and the way in which it is culturally processed. Less educated people are often vulnerable and long for more equality. The stronger their desire for equality, the greater their frustration when feeling vulnerable, and the greater the need to cope with that vulnerability. They do so, using particular narrative-coping strategies that create an affinity with the attitudes that form the new left/right alignment. One such coping strategy is based on feelings of relative deprivation. In the empirical part of the paper it is shown that relative deprivation completely explains the paradoxical position of the less educated, and that, when taking feelings of deprivation into account, the two left/right dimensions are in fact independent of each other at all levels of education, creating a situation that leads to tensions within parties that pursue egalitarian policies. The mechanism uncovered in this analysis reveals a tension at the heart of egalitarianism: the stronger the longing for equality among the vulnerable members of society, the more likely they are to opt for right wing positions on the new left/right dimension.

a b s t r a c tSocial scientists debate the nature of the critique of Islam that has recently become prominent in various European societies. Some consider it as a mere focussing of more general feelings of xenophobia on a new target group, and therefore regard it as an expression of Islam phobia. Others see it as, at least in part, the result of a defence of values and rights that should be universal. This paper seeks to gauge the extent to which anti-Muslim feelings can be considered the consequence of general forms of xenophobia, to what extent they are inspired by adherence to a universalistic conception of human rights. That question is answered on the basis of a sample of 522 university students surveyed in 2009. Besides anti-Muslim feelings four kinds of prejudice are measured. Confirmative factor analysis shows that these can be distinguished from each other in a measurement model. Yet the relationships between the different forms of prejudice are very strong and more than half of the variation in anti-Muslim feelings can be attributed to more general forms of prejudice. Yet, even after controlling for the effects of the four forms of prejudice, adherence to a universalistic conception of human rights adds significantly to anti-Muslim feelings.

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