This paper focuses on the aggregation of distributed energy resources (DERs) through a profit-maximizing intermediary that enables participation of DERs in wholesale electricity markets. Particularly, we study the market efficiency brought in by the large-scale deployment of DERs and explore to what extent such benefits are offset by the profit-maximizing nature of the aggregator. We deploy a game-theoretic framework to study the strategic interactions between agreggators and DER owners. The proposed model explicitly takes into account the stochastic nature of the DER supply. We explicitly characterize the equilibrium of the game under general assumptions and provide illustrative examples to quantify the efficiency loss due to the strategic incentives of the aggregator. Our numerical experiments illustrate the impact of uncertainty and amount of DER integration on the overall market efficiency. * Authors are with the
We propose and analyze semidefinite relaxation based locational marginal prices (RLMPs) for real and reactive power in electricity markets. Our analysis reveals that when the nonconvex economic dispatch problem has zero duality gap, the RLMPs exhibit properties similar to locational marginal prices with linearized power flow equations. Otherwise, they behave similar to convex hull prices. Restricted to radial distribution networks, RLMPs reduce to second-order cone relaxation based distribution locational marginal prices. We illustrate our theoretical results on numerical examples.
Tie-line scheduling in multi-area power systems in the US largely proceeds through a market-based mechanism called Coordinated Transaction Scheduling (CTS). We analyze this market mechanism through a game-theoretic lens. Our analysis characterizes the effect of market liquidity, market participants' forecasts about inter-area price spreads, transactions fees and interaction of CTS markets with financial transmission rights. Using real data, we empirically verify that CTS bidders can employ simple learning algorithms to discover Nash equilibria that support the conclusions drawn from equilibrium analysis.
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