This paper analyses empirically the danger of a Dutch Disease Effect in tourism-dependent countries in the long run. Data on 134 countries of the world over the period 1970-2007 is used. In a first step the long-run relationship between tourism and economic growth is analysed in a crosscountry setting. The results are then checked in a panel data framework on GDP per capita levels that allows to control for reverse causality, non-linearity and interactive effects. It is found that there is no danger of a Beach Disease Effect. On the contrary, tourism-dependent countries do not face real exchange rate distortion and deindustrialization but higher than average economic growth rates. Investment in physical capital, such as transport infrastructure, is complementary to investment in tourism.

What are the economic effects of the Ukraine war for Ukraine, Russia, and the rest of Europe? In this study, the Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (wiiw) sheds light on the immediate consequences on the one hand, but also on the medium-term structural changes caused by the largest armed conflict in Europe since the Second World War. The Russian invasion of Ukraine has triggered a humanitarian crisis. Pre-war, almost 19 m people lived in those regions that are currently directly affected. Refugee inflows to the rest of Europe are likely to be at least three times greater than in 2015/2016. As Black Sea ports come under Russian assault, Ukraine has lost its ability to sell more than half of its exports, primarily agricultural commodities and metals. Western financial support will become ever more important as the war continues. Turning to Russia, sanctions will have a very serious impact on that country’s economy and financial sector. Despite being partly hamstrung by the fact that a large proportion of Russian reserve assets are frozen in the EU and G7, the central bank managed to stabilise financial markets by a combination of confidence-building and hard-steering measures: capital controls, FX controls, regulatory easing for financial institutions, and a doubling of the key policy rate. The medium-term and long-term outlook is negative. As a result of the war and the sanctions, the rest of Europe faces a surge in already high inflation; this will weigh on real incomes and will depress economic growth. Many European countries rely heavily on Russia for oil and gas imports: import shares are over 75% in Czechia, Latvia, Hungary, Slovakia, and Bulgaria with respect to natural gas; Slovakia, Lithuania, Poland, and Finland with respect to oil and petroleum; and Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Denmark, Lithuania, Greece, and Bulgaria with respect to solid fuels. Aside from energy, the fallout via trade for the rest of Europe is likely to be small. Non-energy trade and investment links between Russia and many European countries have declined in importance since 2013. There are four main areas of structural change and lasting impact for the EU (and Europe more broadly) as a result of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. First, the EU will get more serious about defence. Second, the green transition will gather pace. Third, broader Eurasian economic integration will be unwound. And fourth, the EU accession prospects for countries in Southeast Europe could (and should) improve. Supplementary Information The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s10368-022-00546-5.

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Despite the proclaimed return of industrial policy (Wade, 2012) state aid provided by EU Member States remains at a historically low level. This is partly explained by the unique institutional arrangement in the EU which empowers the European Commission to monitor and restrict state aid activities of Member States. Making use of European state aid statistics over the period 1995-2011 we employ an augmented macroeconomic export function to investigate the relationship between state aid for the manufacturing sector and Member States' export performance. With manufacturing value added exports serving as a proxy for export performance, our model suggests that a 10% increase in manufacturing aid increases exports by 0.67% for the average EU country. The result is confirmed by instrumental variable estimation. We also find that the impact of state aid on exports is increasing with government effectiveness leading to large differences in the leverage of aid expenditures to promote export performance across Member States.

Th e article analyses the issue of economic inequality in the transition economies of Central, East and Southeast Europe. It consists of a literature review and a descriptive analysis as well as an econometric modelling exercise. In the fi rst part we point at the fact that the rise in income inequality was triggered by the magnitude of transitional output loss and a reduction of formal employment. Rising wage inequality was at the core of total income dispersion, while government transfers had a redistributional function only in Central and Southeast European countries contrary to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). In the econometric analysis it is found that for instance public utilities infrastructure liberalisation has increased inequality in transition, while price and trade liberalisation has decreased it. A high share of employment in industry and high government expenditures are connected with less inequality.