This chapter examines the Middle East’s security dilemmas by reconsidering the balance of power and threats in light of the Arab Spring. Although external actors are still important, as is regime security, in this balance, an important feature of the current scene is the ‘securitization of identities’ whereby rival regimes mobilize different identities to preserve and consolidate their positions against the destabilizing effects of change. The chapter also explores the emergence of a region-based rivalry between monarchies and republics and how they were affected by the Arab uprisings; the strategic competition between Sunni and Shia Islam; and the impact of the ‘Shia crescent’ from 2003 to the aftermath of the 2011 uprisings. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the ways that competition among rival Sunni regimes in the aftermath of the 2011 uprisings has been ideologically shaped in terms of support for/opposition to the Muslim Brotherhood.

This chapter explores contemporary security in the Middle East by highlighting the nexus between the uses and justification of violence. Focusing on the post 9/11 reordering of the Middle East, it shows how state and non-state actors use the rhetoric of the ‘war on terror’ to depoliticize military interventions against political rivals. More specifically, it argues that such actors mobilize the politics of shame to contain and undermine their rivals. Such efforts are met with attempts to counter-shame and re-politicize the use of violence, producing a cycle of action and counter-action that seeks to legitimize and delegitimize competing visions of security and order in the Middle East. In this context, security and insecurity are two sides of the same coin that fluctuate according to the prevailing balance of power.

After the end of the Cold War, multilateral peace operations have become a privileged tool of international politics, with the purpose of ending conflicts, establishing and maintaining peace, as well as building states and institutions. During the last decade the number of multilateral peace operations has risen to more than 130 missions in 50 countries 3. Reiterated failure, lack of effectiveness, as well as objection to peace operations, has raised the question of legitimacy, however.

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The main aim of this chapter is to conceptualise the conflict between states and non-state armed groups in the Middle East. It begins by tracing the colonial origin of the distinction between state and non-state violence, the emergence of counterinsurgency and its reincarnation in liberal interventions. It then considers the politics of demarcation of legitimate and illegitimate violence and its centrality in the scramble among local and international state and non-state actors to control the Middle East. The chapter analyses the effects of both physical violence and ideological confrontation in the origins and consequences of political violence in the Middle East. It finally illustrates these dynamics by analysing the concerted international and Lebanese campaign to destroy Hezbollah and the resilience of Hezbollah to withstand such enormous pressure and become stronger as a result.