Three studies examined how the perception that one’s attitudes are based in values affects attitude clarity and correctness. Specifically, perceiving that one’s attitude is based in important values increases attitude clarity (the subjective sense that one knows one’s attitude) but not attitude correctness (the subjective sense that the attitude is correct). To test this, participants read a counterattitudinal message and were given feedback about the basis of their attitude. Relative to participants who learned that their attitudes were weakly based in values, participants who were told that their attitudes were strongly based in values reported greater attitude clarity than correctness (Study 1). Similarly, increases in attitude clarity from having an attitude based in values increased the perception that participants effortfully processed the message (Studies 2 and 3), the belief that participants more successfully resisted the message, and participants’ intentions to act on the attitude.

The present research examines whether the perceived uniqueness of one’s thoughts and salience of uniqueness motivations can influence attitude strength and resistance. Participants who rated their thoughts as relatively unique formed attitudes that showed greater correspondence with behavioral intentions to act on the attitude (Study 1). In Study 2, participants who recalled a previous purchase motivated by the desire to be unique (versus to fit in) after generating message counterarguments were less persuaded (more resistant) and reported greater willingness to act on their (negative) attitude. Moreover, attitudes mediated the effect of the purchase manipulation on intentions to act on the attitude.

Morality – the subjective sense that humans discern between right and wrong – plays a ubiquitous role in everyday life. Deontological reasoning conceptualizes moral decision-making as rigid, such that many moral choices are forbidden or required. Not surprisingly, the language used in measures of deontological reasoning tends to be rigid, including phrases such as “always” and “never.” Two studies (N = 553) drawn from two different populations used commonly used measures of moral reasoning and measures of morality to examine the link between individual differences in deontological reasoning and language on the endorsement of moral foundations. Participants low on deontological reasoning generally showed less endorsement for moral principles when extreme language was used in the measures (relative to less extreme language).

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