System trespassing by computer intruders is a growing concern among millions of Internet users. However, little research has employed criminological insights to explore the effectiveness of security means to deter unauthorized access to computer systems. Drawing on the deterrence perspective, we employ a large set of target computers built for the sole purpose of being attacked and conduct two independent experiments to investigate the influence of a warning banner on the progression, frequency, and duration of system trespassing incidents. In both experiments, the target computers (86 computers in the first experiment and 502 computers in the second) were set either to display or not to display a warning banner once intruders had successfully infiltrated the systems; 1,058 trespassing incidents were observed in the first experiment and 3,768 incidents in the second. The findings reveal that although a warning banner does not lead to an immediate termination or a reduction in the frequency of trespassing incidents, it significantly reduces their duration. Moreover, we find that the effect of a warning message on the duration of repeated trespassing incidents is attenuated in computers with a large bandwidth capacity. These findings emphasize the relevance of restrictive deterrence constructs in the study of system trespassing.System trespassing, which is defined as "illegally gaining access to one or more computer systems after exploiting security vulnerabilities or defeating a security barrier" (McQuade, 2006: 83), is one of the fastest growing areas of cybercrime (Furnell, 2002). According to a recent survey of more than 580 information technology (IT) practitioners employed by large organizations and governmental agencies, 90 percent of U.S.

Fear of crime has long been considered a significant social problem, spurring decades of academic research and leading to a variety of policy initiatives. Building on prior research, this study investigated the direct and indirect effects of demographic characteristics, social and physical disorder, and prior victimization on fear of crime. Further, it assessed the direct and indirect effects of perceived risk on fear. Finally, the research examined the extent to which social capital mediated the impact of these variables on fear. Using data from a survey of residents in a southeastern city, analyses reveal that victimization and disorder significantly predict fear of crime, and that risk perception and social capital mediate the relationship between disorder and victimization on fear. Further, structural equation models show a number of interesting indirect effects. Policy implications and directions for future research are discussed.

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This Campbell systematic review examines the effects of interventions to deter corporate crime. The review examines the effectiveness of formal legal and administrative strategies to lower the risk of non‐compliance. The authors summarized 106 studies, and the interventions are grouped into six intervention categories, each with sub‐categories. The intervention groups are: (1) laws, (2) punitive sanctions (e.g. arrest, fines, or a likelihood of prosecution), (3) non‐punitive actions by regulatory agencies (e.g. cease and desist orders) (4) regulatory policies (e.g. company inspections), (5) other sanctions, and (6) multiple treatments. Legal interventions have a small deterrent effect on company non‐compliance and at the geographical level. There is not enough data to determine the effects of legal interventions on deterring individual offending. Regulatory interventions have a modest but consistent deterrent effect on individual offending. Their effects on deterrence at the company level were mixed. The use of more than one intervention at the same time was found to have a small but consistent effect on deterring non‐compliance among individuals and among corporations. Evidence on the effects of the other interventions on non‐compliance was mixed. Conclusions about their effects therefore cannot be drawn. Overall, the quality of evidence was low, with several contradictory findings. Older studies were more likely to find significant effects, but this may reflect weaker study designs. Executive summary/Abstract BACKGROUNDCorporate crime is a poorly understood problem with little known about effective strategies to prevent and control it. Competing definitions of corporate crime affect how the phenomenon is studied and implications for reducing it. Therefore, in this review, we use John Braithwaite's definition (1984: 6) which specifies that corporate crime is “the conduct of a corporation, or of employees acting on behalf of a corporation, which is proscribed and punishable by law.” Consistent with this approach, this review focuses on various legal strategies aimed at companies and their officials/managers to curtail corporate crime. Interventions may be punitive or cooperative, but the goal is to prevent offending and increase levels of corporate compliance. OBJECTIVESOur overall objective is to identify and synthesize published and unpublished studies on formal legal and administrative prevention and control strategies—i.e., the actions and programs of government law enforcement agencies, legislative bodies, and regulatory agencies on corporate crime. We then assess the impact of these strategies on individual and company offending. Included are legal and administrative interventions such as new laws or changes in laws, inspections by regulatory agencies, punitive sanctions and non‐punitive interventions aimed at deterring or controlling illegal behaviors. CRITERIA FOR INCLUSION OF STUDIESWe were highly inclusive in our selection criteria, including studies that encompass a wide variety of methodologies: exper...