Corporate Crime Deterrence: A Systematic Review

Abstract

This Campbell systematic review examines the effects of interventions to deter corporate crime. The review examines the effectiveness of formal legal and administrative strategies to lower the risk of non‐compliance. The authors summarized 106 studies, and the interventions are grouped into six intervention categories, each with sub‐categories. The intervention groups are: (1) laws, (2) punitive sanctions (e.g. arrest, fines, or a likelihood of prosecution), (3) non‐punitive actions by regulatory agencies (e.g. cease and desist orders) (4) regulatory policies (e.g. company inspections), (5) other sanctions, and (6) multiple treatments. Legal interventions have a small deterrent effect on company non‐compliance and at the geographical level. There is not enough data to determine the effects of legal interventions on deterring individual offending. Regulatory interventions have a modest but consistent deterrent effect on individual offending. Their effects on deterrence at the company level were mixed. The use of more than one intervention at the same time was found to have a small but consistent effect on deterring non‐compliance among individuals and among corporations. Evidence on the effects of the other interventions on non‐compliance was mixed. Conclusions about their effects therefore cannot be drawn. Overall, the quality of evidence was low, with several contradictory findings. Older studies were more likely to find significant effects, but this may reflect weaker study designs. Executive summary/Abstract BACKGROUNDCorporate crime is a poorly understood problem with little known about effective strategies to prevent and control it. Competing definitions of corporate crime affect how the phenomenon is studied and implications for reducing it. Therefore, in this review, we use John Braithwaite's definition (1984: 6) which specifies that corporate crime is “the conduct of a corporation, or of employees acting on behalf of a corporation, which is proscribed and punishable by law.” Consistent with this approach, this review focuses on various legal strategies aimed at companies and their officials/managers to curtail corporate crime. Interventions may be punitive or cooperative, but the goal is to prevent offending and increase levels of corporate compliance. OBJECTIVESOur overall objective is to identify and synthesize published and unpublished studies on formal legal and administrative prevention and control strategies—i.e., the actions and programs of government law enforcement agencies, legislative bodies, and regulatory agencies on corporate crime. We then assess the impact of these strategies on individual and company offending. Included are legal and administrative interventions such as new laws or changes in laws, inspections by regulatory agencies, punitive sanctions and non‐punitive interventions aimed at deterring or controlling illegal behaviors. CRITERIA FOR INCLUSION OF STUDIESWe were highly inclusive in our selection criteria, including studies that encompass a wide variety of methodologies: exper...

Reimagining Sutherland 80 years after white‐collar crime*

“…Nearly eight decades on since Sutherland's address () all of the definitional revisions and recalibrations have not clarified the phenomenon (Levi, in press). Instead, it has created definitional ambiguity (Rorie, Alper, Shelly‐Busey, & Simpson, ; Simpson et al., ). The subject matter is amorphous.…”

Regulation and governance versus criminology: Disciplinary divides, intersections, and opportunities

“…Simpson et al . ). Critical corporate criminology, on the other hand, remains centrally focused on a model of response that is grounded in the deterrence of calculated, rational offending (Tombs & Whyte , ).…”

“…Similarly, the systematic, objective account of deterrence‐based approaches to corporate crime undertaken by Simpson et al . () highlights the role that evidence of this sort plays in underpinning normative theory. The marrying of these interpretative tendencies with evidence‐based objectivity of this sort allows criminological scholarship to assist regulatory governance scholars in engaging in a more politicized analysis of the empirical relation between states and markets (Mascini ) and of the consequences of regulatory governance arrangements for both the elites and the “powerless.” The difficulty of doing so perhaps accounts for the relative decline in the visibility and influence of corporate crime scholarship.…”

“…As a discipline, criminology offers an insight into a range of motivations beyond those associated with economic rationality, and has begun to make a more sophisticated contribution to debates around corporate deterrence, stressing the relative merits of prevention and cooperative education, the need for consistent engagement, and the upsides of administrative sanctioning (e.g. Simpson et al 2014). Critical corporate criminology, on the other hand, remains centrally focused on a model of response that is grounded in the deterrence of calculated, rational offending (Tombs & Whyte 2007.…”

“…John Braithwaite, a social advocate and an outstanding academic, has argued for the combination of this commitment to social movements with a commitment to good science via research that integrates explanatory and normative theory (Braithwaite 2002, p. x). Similarly, the systematic, objective account of deterrence-based approaches to corporate crime undertaken by Simpson et al (2014) highlights the role that evidence of this sort plays in underpinning normative theory. The marrying of these interpretative tendencies with evidence-based objectivity of this sort allows criminological scholarship to assist regulatory governance scholars in engaging in a more politicized analysis of the empirical relation between states and markets (Mascini 2013) and of the consequences of regulatory governance arrangements for both the elites and the "powerless."…”