A close reading of academic literature reveals that we do not all conceive of human rights in the same way. This contribution proposes that "natural scholars" conceive of human rights as given ; "deliberative scholars" as agreed upon ; "protest scholars" as fought for ; and "discourse scholars" as talked about . The position of each of these four schools on the foundation, universality, possible realization, and legal embodiment of human rights is reviewed, as well as is the schools' faith, or lack thereof, in human rights. Quotations from academic texts illustrate how the four school model cuts across the academic disciplines with examples drawn from philosophy, politics, law, and anthropology.

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Universalism and relativism are often presented as two opposite and irreconcilable moral (or epistemological) positions as regards human rights. Most often, the debate is phrased as if one should embrace either one or the other position. This chapter argues that these two positions cannot be considered independently of each other. Each is untenable by itself and needs to accommodate the other to be sustainable. The position I advocate, which encompasses both the universalist and the relativist stances, is not a middle position that would constitute a happy compromise, putting at rest, once and for all, the debate concerning the respective strengths of universalism and relativism. Rather it is a position which makes sense of the fact that a moral agent is inevitably drawn into a pendulum motion. Thus, as one accepts being drawn towards relativism, there is a moment when, getting as it were too close to it, one is compelled to revert towards universalism ± and vice versa. My image of the pendulum indicates that the in-between position I advocate is unstable. That my position is characterized by instability does not imply that one should abandon striving to`get things right', for example by drafting human rights legislation, but that one should pursue political struggles in awareness of the limitations that any achievement in this ®eld, however remarkable, entail.True law is right reason on agreement with Nature; it is of universal application, unchanging and everlasting . . . It is a sin to try to alter this law, nor is it allowable to repeal any part of it, and it is impossible to abolish it entirely . . . And there will not be different laws at Rome and Athens . . . but one eternal and unchangeable law will be valid for all nations and for all times, and there will be one master and one ruler, that is God, over us all, for us all, for he is the author of this law, its promulgator and its enforcing judge.

The treatment of migrants is one of the most challenging issues that human rights, as a political philosophy, faces today. It has increasingly become a contentious issue for many governments and international organizations around the world. This book examines the way in which two institutions tasked with ensuring the protection of human rights—the European Court of Human Rights and Inter-American Court of Human Rights—treat claims lodged by migrants. It combines legal, sociological, and historical analysis to show that the two courts were the product of different backgrounds, which led to differing attitudes towards migrants in their founding texts, and that these differences were reinforced in their developing case law. The book assesses the case law of both courts in detail to argue that they approach migrant cases from fundamentally different perspectives. It asserts that the European Court of Human Rights treats migrants first as aliens, and then, but only as a second step in its reasoning, as human beings. By contrast, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights approaches migrants first as human beings, and secondly as foreigners (if they are). The book argues therefore that the Inter-American Court of Human Rights takes a fundamentally more human rights-driven approach to this issue. The book shows how these trends formed at the courts, and assesses whether their approaches have changed over time. It also assesses in detail the issue of the detention of irregular migrants. Ultimately it analyses whether the divergence in the case law of the two courts is likely to continue, or whether they could potentially adopt a more unified practice.