Blockchain is a technology making the shared registry concept from distributed systems a reality for a number of application domains, from the cryptocurrency one to potentially any industrial system requiring decentralized, robust, trusted and automated decision making in a multistakeholder situation. Nevertheless, the actual advantages in using blockchain instead of any other traditional solution (such as centralized databases) are not completely understood to date, or at least there is a strong need for a vademecum guiding designers toward the right decision about when to adopt blockchain or not, which kind of blockchain better meets use-case requirements, and how to use it. In this article we aim at providing the community with such a vademecum, while giving a general presentation of blockchain that goes beyond its usage in Bitcoin and surveying a selection of the vast literature that emerged in the last few years. We draw the key requirements and their evolution when passing from permissionless to permissioned blockchains, presenting the differences between proposed and experimented consensus mechanisms, and describing existing blockchain platforms.
In the Bitcoin blockchain, rewarding methods for remunerating miners participating in a pool have to meet certain requirements in order to guarantee the proper functioning of the cryptocurrency ecosystem. In particular, these allocation rules reward pool participants in proportion to their contribution in the transaction validation process. Deployed rewarding methods met fairness concerns at the expense of vulnerability to miners exploiting pools' attractiveness for deciding when to mine for a pool and when to 'hop' to another one resulting more attractive: a phenomenon called pool-hopping. The most used score-based methods are designed to prevent this practice, but are not completely hopping proof.In this work, we propose a methodology to analyze the pool-hopping phenomenon, focusing on the detection of poolhoppers. Analyzing those Bitcoin transactions that pools create for rewarding its participants, it is possible to determine time epochs where miners worked. Thus, we analyze those miners that have worked intermittently for pools adopting a rewarding system which pays out for each validated block. This evaluation leads us qualifying the miners that have hopped along with their hopping behavior and financial performance.
In this paper we address the distributed cross-chain swap problem in the blockchain context where multiple agents exchange assets across multiple blockchain systems (e.g. trading Bitcoins for Litecoins or Ethers). We present a mathematical framework allowing to characterize blockchain swap protocols as the combination of a publishing and a commitment phase, where contracts are respectively published and then committed. We characterize the equilibria of existing cross-chain swap protocols (i.e., blockchain swap protocols exchanging assets among different blockchains). More precisely, we prove that following a swap protocol characterized by concurrent publishing of exchange contracts and snap (immediate) assets transfers is a Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, we prove that for protocols with a sequential publishing and commitment of the assets transfers, following the prescribed protocol is a sub-game perfect equilibrium.
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