Background In December, 2019, the newly identified severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) emerged in Wuhan, China, causing COVID-19, a respiratory disease presenting with fever, cough, and often pneumonia. WHO has set the strategic objective to interrupt spread of SARS-CoV-2 worldwide. An outbreak in Bavaria, Germany, starting at the end of January, 2020, provided the opportunity to study transmission events, incubation period, and secondary attack rates.Methods A case was defined as a person with SARS-CoV-2 infection confirmed by RT-PCR. Case interviews were done to describe timing of onset and nature of symptoms and to identify and classify contacts as high risk (had cumulative face-to-face contact with a confirmed case for ≥15 min, direct contact with secretions or body fluids of a patient with confirmed COVID-19, or, in the case of health-care workers, had worked within 2 m of a patient with confirmed COVID-19 without personal protective equipment) or low risk (all other contacts). High-risk contacts were ordered to stay at home in quarantine for 14 days and were actively followed up and monitored for symptoms, and low-risk contacts were tested upon self-reporting of symptoms. We defined fever and cough as specific symptoms, and defined a prodromal phase as the presence of non-specific symptoms for at least 1 day before the onset of specific symptoms. Whole genome sequencing was used to confirm epidemiological links and clarify transmission events where contact histories were ambiguous; integration with epidemiological data enabled precise reconstruction of exposure events and incubation periods. Secondary attack rates were calculated as the number of cases divided by the number of contacts, using Fisher's exact test for the 95% CIs.Findings Patient 0 was a Chinese resident who visited Germany for professional reasons. 16 subsequent cases, often with mild and non-specific symptoms, emerged in four transmission generations. Signature mutations in the viral genome occurred upon foundation of generation 2, as well as in one case pertaining to generation 4. The median incubation period was 4•0 days (IQR 2•3-4•3) and the median serial interval was 4•0 days (3•0-5•0). Transmission events were likely to have occurred presymptomatically for one case (possibly five more), at the day of symptom onset for four cases (possibly five more), and the remainder after the day of symptom onset or unknown. One or two cases resulted from contact with a case during the prodromal phase. Secondary attack rates were 75•0% (95% CI 19•0-99•0; three of four people) among members of a household cluster in common isolation, 10•0% (1•2-32•0; two of 20) among household contacts only together until isolation of the patient, and 5•1% (2•6-8•9; 11 of 217) among non-household, high-risk contacts.Interpretation Although patients in our study presented with predominately mild, non-specific symptoms, infectiousness before or on the day of symptom onset was substantial. Additionally, the incubation period was often very short ...

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We surveyed European infectious disease epidemiologists and microbiologists about their decisions to apply for Ebola response missions. Of 368 respondents, 49 (15%) had applied. Applicants did not differ from non-applicants in terms of age, sex or profession but had more training in field epidemiology and more international experience. Common concerns included lack of support from families and employers. Clearer terms of reference and support from employers could motivate application and support outbreak response in West Africa.

In July 2013, a passenger died of infectious extensively drug-resistant tuberculosis (XDR-TB) on board of an aircraft after a 3-hour flight from Turkey to Germany. Initial information indicated the patient had moved about the aircraft coughing blood. We thus aimed to contact and inform all persons exposed within the aircraft and to test them for newly acquired TB infection. Two-stage testing within 8 weeks from exposure and at least 8 weeks after exposure was suggested, using either interferon gamma release assays (IGRAs) or tuberculin skin test (TST). The TST cut-off was defined at a diameter > 10 mm; for differentiation between conversion and boosting, conversion was defined as increase of skin induration > 5 mm. Overall, 155 passengers and seven crew members were included in the investigation: the questionnaire response rate was 83%; 112 (69%) persons were tested at least once for TB infection. In one passenger, who sat next to the area where the patient died, a test conversion was registered. As of March 2017, no secondary active TB cases have been reported. We describe an unusual situation in which we applied contact tracing beyond existing European guidelines; we found one latent tuberculosis infection in a passenger, which we consider probably newly acquired.

When a person with contagious measles has travelled by aircraft, European guidelines recommend contact tracing of passengers and crew within 5 days of exposure for post-exposure prophylaxis (PEP), and within 12 days of exposure for informing passengers and crew, in order to prevent further transmissions. To be effective, contact tracing requires prompt diagnosis, immediate notification of public health authorities and rapid availability of passenger contact data. We report two events of contact tracing initiated in Germany after two individuals with measles travelled on three international flights. In one event, contact tracing was initiated late because laboratory confirmation of a clinically diagnosed measles case was awaited unnecessarily. Accessing passenger contact data was difficult in both events because of data protection issues with the airline which was not based in Germany. In both events, passengers were not reached in time to provide PEP, and one event resulted in at least two secondary measles cases. As all passengers were reached before the incubation period ended, tertiary cases were most probably prevented. Public health authorities and the transport sector must collaborate to resolve competing legal regulations for infection prevention and data protection, to simplify and accelerate identification of air travellers exposed to communicable diseases.

ZusammenfassungCOVID-19 stellt unsere Gesellschaft seit Januar 2020 vor große Herausforderungen. Durch den globalen Reiseverkehr konnte sich das neue Coronavirus rasch weltweit ausbreiten. In diesem Artikel sollen übersichtsartig die Herausforderungen bei der Implementierung von Maßnahmen im Flug- und Schiffsverkehr aus Sicht des Öffentlichen Gesundheitsdienstes (ÖGD) dargestellt werden. Dies erfolgt anhand einer Auswahl von Ereignissen und Maßnahmen zwischen Januar und August 2020. Die gewonnenen Erkenntnisse werden diskutiert.Während der COVID-19-Pandemie bewegt sich der ÖGD in einem Spannungsfeld, das sich aus der Dynamik wissenschaftlicher Erkenntnisse, politischer Entscheidungen und der Akzeptanz und Zustimmung in der Gesellschaft ergibt. An Grenzübergangsstellen wie Flug- und Seehäfen gibt es besondere Herausforderungen. Dazu gehören insbesondere Personalengpässe und die Notwendigkeit, Maßnahmen mit hohem organisatorischen Aufwand sehr kurzfristig umzusetzen, wie etwa gesundheitsbehördliche Passagierkontrollen direkt an Luftfahrzeugen, die Einrichtung von Testzentren an Grenzübergangsstellen sowie die Überprüfung der Einhaltung von Quarantänevorgaben. Erschwerend kommt hinzu, dass Passagierlisten, die zur effektiven Kontaktpersonennachverfolgung notwendig sind, oft fehlen oder unvollständig sind. Ebenso fehlen digitale Tools für das Kontaktpersonenmanagement, aber z. B. auch für den Austausch personenbezogener Daten innerhalb des ÖGD. Weitere Schwierigkeiten beim Ausbruchsmanagement ergeben sich durch die engen Verhältnisse an Bord von Schiffen und durch die mögliche psychische Belastung von Besatzung und Passagieren, die in den Maßnahmen noch nicht ausreichend berücksichtigt werden.Angesichts all dieser Herausforderungen ist es notwendig, den ÖGD langfristig zu stärken – allgemein und an den Grenzübergangsstellen – und den Bund-Länder-Austausch im Flug- und Schiffsverkehr zu intensivieren.

Background. Evidence on the risk of SARS-CoV-2 transmission during air travel is scarce. We aimed to estimate the attack rate for wild-type SARS-CoV-2 to improve the evidence base for the adaptation of nonpharmaceutical intervention (NPI) strategies aboard airplanes. Methods. In collaboration with German Public Health Authorities (PHA), we conducted a follow-up of in-flight SARS-CoV-2 contact persons. We included those contact persons whom the Emergency Operations Centre at the Robert Koch-Institute had forwarded to PHA between January to March 2020 (before masking on flights became mandatory) and June to August 2020 (after the introduction of mandatory masking). We retrospectively collected data on whether these contact persons had been successfully contacted, had become symptomatic and had been tested for SARS-CoV-2, and whether alternative exposures other than the flight were known. Results. Complete data that allowed for the calculation of attack rates were available for 108 contact persons (median age of 36 (IQR 24–53), 40% female), traveling on 46 flights with a median flight duration of 3 hours (IQR 2–3.5). 62 of these persons travelled after masking on flights became mandatory. 13/87 developed symptoms, 44/77 were tested (no data for 21 and 31). 13 persons (9 of whom had been SARS-CoV-2 positive) were excluded from the analysis of attack rates due to a likely alternative exposure. We thus identified 4 probable in-flight transmissions (2 of which occurred after the introduction of mandatory masking). The overall attack rate resulted in 4.2% (4/95; 95% CI: 1.4%–11.0%). Considering flights after mandatory masking, the attack rate was 3.6% (2/56, 95% CI 0.6%–13.4%), before masking 5.1% (2/39, 95% CI 0.9%–18.6%). Conclusions. The risk of wild-type SARS-CoV-2 transmission during air travel seemed low, but not negligible. In order to formulate an effective, evidence-based NPI protocol for air travel, further studies considering the different transmissibility of SARS-CoV-2 variants of concern and vaccination status are needed.

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