In this work we study the opinion evolution in a community-based population with intergroup interactions. We address two issues. First, we consider that such intergroup interactions can be negative with some probability p. We develop a coupled mean-field approximation that still preserves the community structure and it is able to capture the richness of the results arising from our Monte Carlo simulations: continuous and discontinuous order-disorder transitions as well as nonmonotonic ordering for an intermediate community strength. In the second part, we consider only positive interactions, but with the presence of inflexible agents holding a minority opinion. We also consider an indecision noise: a probability q that allows the spontaneous change of opinions to the neutral state. Our results show that the modular structure leads to a nonmonotonic global ordering as q increases. This inclination toward neutrality plays a dual role: a moderated propensity to neutrality helps the initial minority to become a majority, but this noise-driven opinion switching becomes less pronounced if the agents are too susceptible to become neutral.

In this work we consider a model of epidemic spreading coupled with an opinion dynamics in a fully-connected population. Regarding the opinion dynamics, the individuals may be in two distinct states, namely in favor or against a vaccination campaign. Individuals against the vaccination follow a standard SIS model, whereas the pro-vaccine individuals can also be in a third compartment, namely Vaccinated.In addition, the opinions change according to the majority-rule dynamics in groups with three individuals. We also consider that the vaccine can give permanent or temporary immunization to the individuals. By means of analytical calculations and computer simulations, we show that the opinion dynamics can drastically affect the disease propagation, and that the engagement of the pro-vaccine individuals can be crucial for stopping the epidemic spreading. The full numerical code for simulate the model is available from the authors' webpage.

We extend to the gamut of functional forms of the probability distribution of the time-dependent step-length a previous model dubbed Elephant Quantum Walk, which considers a uniform distribution and yields hyperballistic dynamics where the variance grows cubicly with time, σ2 ∝ t3, and a Gaussian for the position of the walker. We investigate this proposal both locally and globally with the results showing that the time-dependent interplay between interference, memory and long-range hopping leads to multiple transitions between dynamical regimes, namely ballistic → diffusive → superdiffusive → ballistic → hyperballistic for non-hermitian coin whereas the first diffusive regime is quelled for implementations using the Hadamard coin. In addition, we observe a robust asymptotic approach to maximal coin-space entanglement.

This work consists of an epidemic model with vaccination coupled with an opinion dynamics. Our objective was to study how disease risk perception can influence opinions about vaccination and therefore the spreading of the disease. Differently from previous works we have considered continuous opinions. The epidemic spreading is governed by an SIS-like model with an extra vaccinated state. In our model individuals vaccinate with a probability proportional to their opinions. The opinions change due to peer influence in pairwise interactions. The epidemic feedback to the opinion dynamics acts as an external field increasing the vaccination probability. We performed Monte Carlo simulations in fully-connected populations. Interestingly we observed the emergence of a first-order phase transition, besides the usual activeabsorbing phase transition presented in the SIS model. Our simulations also show that with a certain combination of parameters, an increment in the initial fraction of the population that is pro-vaccine has a twofold effect: it can lead to smaller epidemic outbreaks in the short term, but it also contributes to the survival of the chain of infections in the long term. Our results also suggest that it is possible that more effective vaccines can decrease the long-term vaccine coverage. This is a counterintuitive outcome, but it is in line with empirical observations that vaccines can become a victim of their own success.