The game of Go has long been viewed as the most challenging of classic games for artificial intelligence owing to its enormous search space and the difficulty of evaluating board positions and moves. Here we introduce a new approach to computer Go that uses 'value networks' to evaluate board positions and 'policy networks' to select moves. These deep neural networks are trained by a novel combination of supervised learning from human expert games, and reinforcement learning from games of self-play. Without any lookahead search, the neural networks play Go at the level of state-of-the-art Monte Carlo tree search programs that simulate thousands of random games of self-play. We also introduce a new search algorithm that combines Monte Carlo simulation with value and policy networks. Using this search algorithm, our program AlphaGo achieved a 99.8% winning rate against other Go programs, and defeated the human European Go champion by 5 games to 0. This is the first time that a computer program has defeated a human professional player in the full-sized game of Go, a feat previously thought to be at least a decade away.
The game of chess is the longest-studied domain in the history of artificial intelligence. The strongest programs are based on a combination of sophisticated search techniques, domain-specific adaptations, and handcrafted evaluation functions that have been refined by human experts over several decades. By contrast, the AlphaGo Zero program recently achieved superhuman performance in the game of Go by reinforcement learning from self-play. In this paper, we generalize this approach into a single AlphaZero algorithm that can achieve superhuman performance in many challenging games. Starting from random play and given no domain knowledge except the game rules, AlphaZero convincingly defeated a world champion program in the games of chess and shogi (Japanese chess), as well as Go.
Deep reinforcement learning (RL) has achieved several high profile successes in difficult decision-making problems. However, these algorithms typically require a huge amount of data before they reach reasonable performance. In fact, their performance during learning can be extremely poor. This may be acceptable for a simulator, but it severely limits the applicability of deep RL to many real-world tasks, where the agent must learn in the real environment. In this paper we study a setting where the agent may access data from previous control of the system. We present an algorithm, Deep Q-learning from Demonstrations (DQfD), that leverages small sets of demonstration data to massively accelerate the learning process even from relatively small amounts of demonstration data and is able to automatically assess the necessary ratio of demonstration data while learning thanks to a prioritized replay mechanism. DQfD works by combining temporal difference updates with supervised classification of the demonstrator’s actions. We show that DQfD has better initial performance than Prioritized Dueling Double Deep Q-Networks (PDD DQN) as it starts with better scores on the first million steps on 41 of 42 games and on average it takes PDD DQN 83 million steps to catch up to DQfD’s performance. DQfD learns to out-perform the best demonstration given in 14 of 42 games. In addition, DQfD leverages human demonstrations to achieve state-of-the-art results for 11 games. Finally, we show that DQfD performs better than three related algorithms for incorporating demonstration data into DQN.
From the early days of computing, games have been important testbeds for studying how well machines can do sophisticated decision making. In recent years, machine learning has made dramatic advances with artificial agents reaching superhuman performance in challenge domains like Go, Atari, and some variants of poker. As with their predecessors of chess, checkers, and backgammon, these game domains have driven research by providing sophisticated yet well-defined challenges for artificial intelligence practitioners. We continue this tradition by proposing the game of Hanabi as a new challenge domain with novel problems that arise from its combination of purely cooperative gameplay with two to five players and imperfect information. In particular, we argue that Hanabi elevates reasoning about the beliefs and intentions of other agents to the foreground. We believe developing novel techniques for such theory of mind reasoning will not only be crucial for success in Hanabi, but also in broader collaborative efforts, especially those with human partners. To facilitate future research, we introduce the open-source Hanabi Learning Environment, propose an experimental framework for the research community to evaluate algorithmic advances, and assess the performance of current state-of-the-art techniques. 6 One such equilibrium occurs when players do not intentionally communicate information to other players, and ignore what other players tell them (historically called a pooling equilibrium in pure signalling games [15], or a babbling equilibrium in later work using cheap talk [16]). In this case, there is no incentive for a player to start communicating because they will be ignored, and there is no incentive to pay attention to other players because they are not communicating.7 In pure signalling games where actions are purely communicative, policies are often referred to as communication protocols. Though Hanabi is not such a pure signalling game, when we want to emphasize the communication properties of an agent's policy we will still refer to its communication protocol. 8 We use the word convention to refer to the parts of a communication protocol or policy that interrelate. Technically, these can be thought of as constraints on the policy to enact the convention.
We introduce α - Rank , a principled evolutionary dynamics methodology, for the evaluation and ranking of agents in large-scale multi-agent interactions, grounded in a novel dynamical game-theoretic solution concept called Markov - Conley chains (MCCs). The approach leverages continuous-time and discrete-time evolutionary dynamical systems applied to empirical games, and scales tractably in the number of agents, in the type of interactions (beyond dyadic), and the type of empirical games (symmetric and asymmetric). Current models are fundamentally limited in one or more of these dimensions, and are not guaranteed to converge to the desired game-theoretic solution concept (typically the Nash equilibrium). α -Rank automatically provides a ranking over the set of agents under evaluation and provides insights into their strengths, weaknesses, and long-term dynamics in terms of basins of attraction and sink components. This is a direct consequence of the correspondence we establish to the dynamical MCC solution concept when the underlying evolutionary model’s ranking-intensity parameter, α , is chosen to be large, which exactly forms the basis of α -Rank. In contrast to the Nash equilibrium, which is a static solution concept based solely on fixed points, MCCs are a dynamical solution concept based on the Markov chain formalism, Conley’s Fundamental Theorem of Dynamical Systems, and the core ingredients of dynamical systems: fixed points, recurrent sets, periodic orbits, and limit cycles. Our α -Rank method runs in polynomial time with respect to the total number of pure strategy profiles, whereas computing a Nash equilibrium for a general-sum game is known to be intractable. We introduce mathematical proofs that not only provide an overarching and unifying perspective of existing continuous- and discrete-time evolutionary evaluation models, but also reveal the formal underpinnings of the α -Rank methodology. We illustrate the method in canonical games and empirically validate it in several domains, including AlphaGo, AlphaZero, MuJoCo Soccer, and Poker.
Deep reinforcement learning (RL) has achieved several high profile successes in difficult decision-making problems. However, these algorithms typically require a huge amount of data before they reach reasonable performance. In fact, their performance during learning can be extremely poor. This may be acceptable for a simulator, but it severely limits the applicability of deep RL to many real-world tasks, where the agent must learn in the real environment. In this paper we study a setting where the agent may access data from previous control of the system. We present an algorithm, Deep Q-learning from Demonstrations (DQfD), that leverages small sets of demonstration data to massively accelerate the learning process even from relatively small amounts of demonstration data and is able to automatically assess the necessary ratio of demonstration data while learning thanks to a prioritized replay mechanism. DQfD works by combining temporal difference updates with supervised classification of the demonstrator's actions. We show that DQfD has better initial performance than Prioritized Dueling Double Deep Q-Networks (PDD DQN) as it starts with better scores on the first million steps on 41 of 42 games and on average it takes PDD DQN 83 million steps to catch up to DQfD's performance. DQfD learns to out-perform the best demonstration given in 14 of 42 games. In addition, DQfD leverages human demonstrations to achieve state-of-the-art results for 11 games. Finally, we show that DQfD performs better than three related algorithms for incorporating demonstration data into DQN.
This paper provides several theoretical results for empirical game theory. Specifically, we introduce bounds for empirical game theoretical analysis of complex multi-agent interactions. In doing so we provide insights in the empirical meta game showing that a Nash equilibrium of the estimated meta-game is an approximate Nash equilibrium of the true underlying metagame. We investigate and show how many data samples are required to obtain a close enough approximation of the underlying game. Additionally, we extend the evolutionary dynamics analysis of meta-games using heuristic payoff tables (HPTs) to asymmetric games. The stateof-the-art has only considered evolutionary dynamics of symmetric HPTs in which agents have access to the same strategy sets and the payoff structure is symmetric, implying that agents are interchangeable. Finally, we carry out an empirical illustration of the generalised method in several domains, illustrating the theory and evolutionary dynamics of several versions of the AlphaGo algorithm (symmetric), the dynamics of the Colonel Blotto game played by human players on Facebook (symmetric), the dynamics of several teams of players in the capture the flag game (symmetric), and an example of a meta-game in Leduc Poker (asymmetric), generated by the policy-space response oracle multi-agent learning algorithm. Keywords Empirical games • Asymmetric games • Replicator dynamics 1 Introduction Using game theory to examine multi-agent interactions in complex systems is a non-trivial task, especially when a payoff table or normal form representation is not directly available. Works by Walsh et al. [39,40], Wellman et al. [43,44], and Phelps et al. [23], have shown the great potential of using heuristic strategies and empirical game theory to examine such B Karl Tuyls
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