In this paper we analyse the causes of the Spanish property model and its territorial, social, and political consequences. Particular attention is paid to sociopolitical contexts. These consequences include excessive dependence on economic activity and employment in the housing construction sector, the irreversible disappearance of landmarks in the country's collective history and culture, and examples of 'policy capture', especially at local and regional levels. This lengthy process has led to corruption in town planning and an increase in poor policy decisions, greatly harming Spain's reputation.

Spain experienced an outbreak of public sector corruption—much of it related to the involvement of regional and local administrators and politicians in the country's urban development boom—that angered the public and sparked calls for government reform. Using data from a 2009 survey that followed these events, the authors examine the association between perceived corruption and the attitudes and behaviors of citizens, including satisfaction with government and democracy, social and institutional trust, and rule‐breaking behaviors. The findings suggest that perceptions of administrative as well as political corruption are associated with less satisfaction, lower levels of social and institutional trust, and a greater willingness to break rules. Although these survey results cannot prove causation, they are consistent with the notion that administrative and political corruption damages the legitimacy of government in the eyes of citizens and weakens the social fabric of democratic society.

From 1997 to 2007, Spain suffered from major cases of political corruption associated with local urban development. To analyse their causes, this article examines the institutional mechanisms designed to monitor and control the performance of local policy-makers and to ensure they operated independently from private influence. It also analyses their actual effectiveness with reference to particular cases of local corruption unveiled during that decade. The Spanish case shows that local representatives had a large amount of power in distributing financial gains within the municipality, but faced little pressure to account for their actions. It argues that insufficient control mechanisms on the activities of local representatives from 1997 to 2007 can adequately explain the intensity and spread of local corruption in Spain. Points for practitioners The article contributes to a better understanding of the factors and the causes that explain local corruption, particularly in countries where local governments fit with the ‘strong-mayor’ type. Following the Local Integrity System framework, it provides a strategy to analyse the role and impact of control mechanisms, distinguishing between internal and external controls, and administrative and judicial controls. The article also helps to understand, and presents evidence of, the mismatch between ‘formal’ institutional mechanisms on the one hand, and their actual implementation and effects on the other.

Los escándalos de corrupción investigados por los jueces han tenidogran presencia mediática en los últimos años en España. Ello podría habergenerado una percepción generalizada de incremento de la corrupcióny reforzado la desafección institucional. El objetivo de este artículoes analizar qué rasgos cuantitativos y cualitativos tiene la corrupción enEspaña y si la percepción correlaciona con los datos objetivos existentes.El texto parte de tres hipótesis. Para demostrarlas se han analizadoestadísticas judiciales, noticias de medios de comunicación, sumariosjudiciales y datos de diversas encuestas. Este artículo contribuye a unmejor conocimiento de los rasgos de la corrupción en España desde2004 y abre la vía a estudios posteriores más detallados sobre causasy consecuencias del fenómeno.

This paper analyses the problem of corruption in the local government in Spain, where despite a complex and sophisticated set of local rules to ensure due process in town planning and urban development, a great number of corruption incidents have come to light. The explanation of this outcome rests in the combined effect of factors such as the bad design of both integrity rules and town planning policies, the relevance of informal institutions such as the patronage networks, and the existence of perverse incentives. The Spanish case highlights the important influence of local informal institutions for the actual working of formal ones.