Abstract:Policy forums are issue-based intermediary organizations where diverse types of political and societal actors repeatedly interact. Policy forums are important elements of modern governance systems as they allow actors to learn, negotiate, or build trust. They can vary in composition, size, membership logic, and other distinct features. This article lays the foundation of a theory of policy forums based on three interrelated elements: First, it discusses conditions for the formation of a forum and describes the logic of these organizations as one of an asymmetric multipartite exchange. Second, it enumerates the potential set of goals and motivations of participating actors that are fed into this exchange. Third, it proposes eight different dimensions on which policy forums differ and which affect the exchange mechanisms among actors. We claim that empirical work on policy forums should systematically take these elements into account and propose elements of a research agenda.

No abstract

Developed to be interconnected by design, the 17 sustainable development goals (SDGs) and their 169 targets have attracted a growing scientific community committed to exploring the systemic interactions inherent to the 2030 Agenda. Understanding which SDGs influence one another (positively or negatively) is critical to prioritize and implement policies that maximize synergies between goals while navigating trade-offs. In this way, the need for informed decision-making urgently requires knowledge of context-specific SDG interactions. Drawing on an extensive literature review (including scientific reports and scholarly articles), we collected, synthesized,

The study of public policy deals with subsystems in which actors cooperate or compete to turn their beliefs into policy solutions. Yet, most studies concern mature subsystems in which the main actors and their allies and enemies can easily be identified. This paper tackles the challenge of studying nascent subsystems, in which actors have begun to engage in politics but are uncertain about other actors’ beliefs. Actors therefore find it relatively difficult to identify their allies and opponents. Focusing on the Advocacy Coalition Framework, we examine three main ways in which actors might agree to support the same policy design before they decide whether or not to form long-term relationships within advocacy coalitions: they see the issue through the same lenses, they follow leaders, or they know each other from earlier cooperation. We use the case of fracking policy in Switzerland and the UK as a key example, in which actors have begun to agree with each other, but where final policy outputs were not yet defined, and long-term relationships not yet observable. We find that, when dealing with new issues, actors strongly rely on former contacts rather than shared ideologies or leadership

This paper studies the relation between coalition structures in policy processes and policy change. While different factors such as policy images, learning processes, external events, or venue shopping are important to explain policy change, coalition structures within policy processes are often neglected. However, policy change happens as a result of negotiations and coordination among coalitions within policy processes. The paper analyzes how conflict, collaboration, and power relations among coalitions of actors influence policy change in an institutional context of a consensus democracy. Empirically, I rely on a Qualitative Comparative Analysis to conduct a cross‐sector comparison of the 11 most important policy processes in Switzerland between 2001 and 2006. Coalition structures with low conflict and strong collaboration among coalitions as well as structures with dominant coalitions and weak collaboration both facilitate major policy change. Competing coalitions that are separated by strong conflict but still collaborate strongly produce policy outputs that are close to the status quo.

Fragmentation across scales in natural resource governance can impede coordinated action and decrease innovation capacity. Bridging actors who connect others within governance networks helps to overcome this challenge. We analyze two bridging positions for actors in governance networks. First, periphery connectors integrate otherwise unconnected actors and provide access to new knowledge. Second, central coordinators efficiently connect actors at the center of the network and thus facilitate coordinated action. We propose a way to identify periphery connectors and central coordinators within governance networks and formulate expectations about types of actors that are likely to occupy these positions. An analysis of three actor networks in the water supply sector in Switzerland suggests that periphery coordinator positions are more likely to be occupied by organizations at higher jurisdictional levels. Central coordinator positions are more likely to be occupied by governmental actors as compared to nongovernmental actors. Thus, in addressing challenges of fragmentation, higher level governmental actors continue to play an important role, even when they delegate responsibilities to lower level and private actors.

Collaboration between actors in political decision-making processes is crucial from both an actor and a process perspective. Previous studies have highlighted the role of preference similarity, power, and opportunity structures as drivers of collaboration. However, these studies have focused on single policy sectors and have therefore overlooked possible differences in effects across sectors, as well as interactions between sectors. This article innovates by taking a cross-sector perspective. Applying exponential random graph models to collaboration networks covering 11 decisionmaking processes, we show that relational opportunity structures have a fairly consistent influence on collaboration, whereas the effects of social and institutional opportunity structures vary across processes. The effect of institutional opportunity structures is contingent on the importance of institutional arenas. Our hypothesis on cross-sector influences receives partial support. Opportunity structures and interactions between sectors add to preference similarity and power, which have a strong and robust influence on collaborative tie formation.

The idea behind the reputational measure for assessing power of political actors is that actors involved ina decision-making process have the best view of their fellows' power. There has been, however, no sys-tematic examination of why actors consider other actors as powerful.Consequently, it is unclear whetherreputational power measures what it ought to. The paper analyzes the determinants of power attributionand distinguishes intended from unintended determinants in a data-set of power assessment covering10 political decision-making processes in Switzerland. Results are overall reassuring, but neverthelesspoint toward selfpromotion or misperception biases, as informants systematically attribute more powerto actors with whom they collaborate