Purpose This paper aims to compare the effect of ownership on firm performances in the 1997 and 2008 financial crises. More specifically, it investigates the effect of cash flow rights, control rights and cash flow rights leverage on firm performance. Two conditions motivated the study. First, the 2008 financial crisis happened quickly, so it was endogenous for firms. This setting is ideal to deal with endogeneity problems in a study that involves ownership and performance. Second, during the 2000s, awareness and implementation of corporate governance increased significantly. The authors believe that the markets learn these changes and incorporate them into prices, as suggested by an efficient market hypothesis. Design/methodology/approach The paper investigates and compares the effect of ownership structure on firm performance in the 2008 subprime crisis period to that in the 1997 financial crisis. Both crises happen unexpectedly, so the authors can expect that the crises are exogenous to firms. The authors use cash flow rights, control rights and cash flow right leverage for the ownership structure dimension. They also study time-series data to investigate the effect of ownership on a firm’s value. Findings The study finds that cash flow right and cash flow right leverage did not affect stock performance during the subprime crisis of 2008. It also finds that cash flow right leverage and cash flow right affected stock performance during the financial crisis of 1997. The study attributes this finding to the learning process and improvement of corporate governance during the period of the 2000s. Using time-series data, it finds that cash flow rights positively affect firm performance, suggesting an alignment effect. Ownership concentration improves firm performance. When the study split its sample, it found that the effect ownership on firms’ value is stronger for large firms. Research limitations/implications The study’s main limitation is that it does not test directly the learning process hypothesis. The study contributes to the current literature by presenting more recent evidence on the effect of ownership structure on firm performance in a developing country. The authors argue that markets learn the improvement of corporate governance and incorporate this development into prices. Extending this research to other markets will provide confirmation whether the learning process is an international phenomenon. Practical implications The awareness and implementation of corporate governance should be maintained at least at this level. The positive relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance suggests that concentrated ownership performs monitoring more effectively. Investors should pay attention to ownership concentration. Social implications The finding that prices already reflect corporate governance may suggest that market is monitoring this issue. This seems to be a good finding. Markets can be expected to discipline companies in the implementation of corporate governance. The awareness and implementation of corporate governance should be maintained at least at the current level. Originality/value The study contributes to the current literature by presenting additional evidence on the effect of ownership (using cash flow rights, control rights and cash flow right leverage) on firms’ performance in a more recent period and in a developing country. This period is characterized by a significant increase in awareness and the implementation of good corporate governance.

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This study attempts to investigate the issue of the existence of institutional herding in the stock market. The existence is detected in the intraday trade data from the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) during up, down, and stable market condition over the period 2003-2005. By using the model of Lakonishok et al. (1992), it is found that the intensity of the existence of institutional herding at the IDX, on average, is 8.4 percent. Institutional investors do not seem to lead their transactions ina certain characteristic of stock. Most of them follow positive-feedback trading strategy while others follow negative-feedback trading strategy. This study also found that the existence of herd behavior at the IDX did not destabilize the market price in a subsequent period.

Introduction/Main Objectives: This study aims to investigate whether competition impacts bank stability. Furthermore, the study also analyzes the role of institutional quality in a country, such as voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, the rule of law, and control of corruption, forming the effect of competition on bank stability. Background Problem: Analysis of the relationship between competition and bank stability has been at the center of academic and policy debate. However, the theoretical and empirical research has not concluded whether bank competition leads to more or fewer stable banks. Novelty: We consider institutional quality's role in mitigating the negative impact of competition on bank stability, which has mainly been under-elaborated in prior studies, particularly in using measures from The World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators, which measure how the institutions of each country influence bankers’ and the people's behavior, as part of the cultural system. Research Methods: Using a sample of 427 Asian commercial banks from 2011 to 2019, we employ the generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator and consider loan growth and the cost to income ratio as instrumental variables. Findings/Results: We find robust evidence that competition erodes bank stability. Besides, better institutional quality, especially government effectiveness, regulatory quality, the rule of law, and corruption control in each country are important aspects that promote bank stability and mitigate the negative impact of competition on bank stability. Conclusion: Competition has a negative impact on bank stability. Meanwhile, the quality of institutions can both promote bank stability and mitigate this negative relationship.

Cash and its use will connect to many things, such as the performance of corporate governance. This empirical research examines the interaction effect of insider ownership, institutional ownership, and independent board toward the influence of cash policy on the firm value. This research using agency theory framework, corporate governance using Indonesia listed firms’ samples over 2001-2017 (197 firms, 3349 observation). Fixed effect dynamic panel regression and regression-moderated analysis used in this research. We show that these results suggest that the insider ownership, institutional ownership, and independent board strengthen the influence of the corporate cash policy on firm’s value. It develops the previous research findings in Indonesia, especially in the implication of cash management from the perspective of agency theory and corporate governance.JEL Classification: G32, L21

This paper finds out the impact of intellectual capital on firm performance and risk. Moreover, this paper also examines whether the board diversity in terms of gender and nationality can strengthen the effect of intellectual capital towards firm performance and risk that operates in banking industries in ASEAN. The data in this study obtained from Bloomberg and OSIRIS database and also the firm’s annual reports over the period of 2012-2016 (375 observations) and conducted in ASEAN countries, namely Indonesia, Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand. The results find that the efficient and effective use of intellectual capital will make the firms achieved higher performance. Meanwhile, intellectual capital can help reduce credit risk. In the interaction effect, the result is consistent with social psychology theory and shows that the presence of board diversity actually reduces firm performance and increases risk.

Using 182 IPOs in Indonesia Stock Exchange from 2006-2015, we investigate IPO underpricing using agency theory framework. We use two dimensions of agency theory: ownership concentration and institutional ownership. We find that ownership concentration does not have effect on IPO underpricing, while institutional ownership negatively affects IPO underpricing. Institutional ownership seems to be able to monitor IPO underpricing, leading to smaller loss from IPO underpricing. We conduct further investigation. First, we find that institutional ownership does not moderate the effect of ownership concentration on IPO underpricing. Second, we find that the negative effect of institutional ownership on IPO underpricing is stronger when the level of institutional ownership is low. Higher level of institutional ownership seems to increase principal-principal agency conflict and to reduce monitoring effect of institutional ownership. Our results highlight the importance of ownership in company affairs.