This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 4.0 Unported License, permitting all non-commercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
We propose a game-theoretic model of resource-based competition between agents of the same level in a multi-level system with information asymmetry. It is shown that under conditions of uncertainty, the optimism of agents leads to non-optimal solutions and an increase in the loss of the total added value in the system due to resource waste. The mechanisms of optimistic shifts in agent estimates and agent’s Bayesian adjustment are described. Equilibrium conditions are obtained in the proposed model.
scite is a Brooklyn-based organization that helps researchers better discover and understand research articles through Smart Citations–citations that display the context of the citation and describe whether the article provides supporting or contrasting evidence. scite is used by students and researchers from around the world and is funded in part by the National Science Foundation and the National Institute on Drug Abuse of the National Institutes of Health.