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Two interlocking experiments simulated the transmission of hearsay from children to adult hearsay witnesses and from the hearsay witnesses to jurors. Thirty-one children (ages 5-6 years) each observed a janitor either clean or play with toys in a laboratory. Each child was interrogated about the janitor in either a neutral manner that elicited an accurate account or a suggestive manner that elicited an inaccurate account of what the janitor had done. In Experiment 1, adult "witnesses" (N = 112) each observed one of these interrogations and then recounted what the child had said. In Experiment 2, a 2nd group of adults in the role of jurors (N = 104) each heard the account of one of the hearsay witnesses then made judgments about what the janitor had done. Jurors were sensitive to the quality of the hearsay evidence. They gave no weight to hearsay that recounted the inaccurate statements of a child who was questioned suggestively but gave appropriate weight to hearsay that recounted the accurate statements of children questioned in a neutral manner.

The legal rules regarding hearsay rest heavily on "empirical hunches" that could usefully be evaluated through psychological research. Because of the complexity of the rules, psychologists have found it difficult to identify important underlying assumptions that might be tested and lawyers have not appreciated the possible importance of empirical research. This article is designed to help bridge the gap between psychology and law by promoting innovative thinking about the role of empirical research in the evaluation of hearsay. The authors describe the hearsay rules and their rationale in a manner useful to psychological researchers and discuss the prospects for testing underlying assumptions.

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