It is often argued that states do not have any special obligations towards economic migrants, and that skills-based selection of migrants is morally unproblematic. In this paper, I argue that even if one does not endorse special obligations towards economic migrants, there are good reasons to be critical of skills-based selection due to its effect on the citizens in the country they are migrating to. I introduce the issue of the impact of migrant selection on domestic populations by considering Blake's arguments against racial selection in immigration. He argues that racial selection is wrong because '[…] making a statement of racial preference in immigration necessarily makes a statement of racial preference domestically as well'. In this paper, I consider whether a similar case can be made against selecting migrants based on their marketable skills. I begin with a short overview of skills-based selection and some of the normative arguments put forward in favour of it, before considering Blake's argument. Thereafter, I show how Blake's example of race differs significantly from selection based on skills, in part due to the nature of identification with race and skills. However, I argue that the effects of skills-based selection on domestic population also need to be considered in any normative argument proposing such migration regulations. These effects include changes in our evaluations of equality and citizenship, negative impact on the social bases of self-respect, as well as specific disadvantages for segments of society and a negative effect on social mobility.

In response to the COVID pandemic, the Norwegian government implemented the strictest border controls in modern Norwegian history, barring entry to most foreign nationals. The Prime Minister, Erna Solberg, justified these policies with reference to the rise of new COVID variants and the need to limit visitors to Norway as much as possible. As this approach has severe adverse effects on many people, there is a need to critically examine the justification given for closing the border. In this paper, we argue that while many border restrictions are legitimate, (1) the arguments given for the recent banning of entry for groups of people are not convincing, and (2) that the ban unduly limits personal freedoms and places an unjust burden on transnational citizens and Norwegians with close relations abroad. Keywords: COVID-19, Border Closure, Border Restrictions, Justice, Sovereignty, Nationalism, Immigration, Freedom, Ignorance

Current admission criteria for migrants in Western states tend to favor the well-to-do, able-bodied, and well-qualified. This leads to migration patterns that exacerbate global inequalities. In this article, I will consider how economic migration affects global inequality of opportunity, and how we might alter admission criteria in order to mitigate negative effects. I will proceed by discussing cosmopolitan and nationalist positions to open borders and economic migration. In particular, I will address David Miller’s objections to using open borders to remedy global inequality of opportunity. The argument I present agrees with the benefits of a conception of justice that allows for degrees of partiality and a state’s right to control their borders. However, I argue that Western states’ roles in perpetuating global inequality of opportunity leads to moral demands, which can in part be met by fair economic migration. Furthermore, I will consider what fairer economic migration might consist in. The model I propose would rank migrants based on their level of disadvantage, how little their emigration would affect the country they are emigrating from, and how great it might improve the opportunities in the country they are moving to.