Statements on race and class: the fairness of skills-based immigration criteria

Abstract

It is often argued that states do not have any special obligations towards economic migrants, and that skills-based selection of migrants is morally unproblematic. In this paper, I argue that even if one does not endorse special obligations towards economic migrants, there are good reasons to be critical of skills-based selection due to its effect on the citizens in the country they are migrating to. I introduce the issue of the impact of migrant selection on domestic populations by considering Blake's arguments against racial selection in immigration. He argues that racial selection is wrong because '[…] making a statement of racial preference in immigration necessarily makes a statement of racial preference domestically as well'. In this paper, I consider whether a similar case can be made against selecting migrants based on their marketable skills. I begin with a short overview of skills-based selection and some of the normative arguments put forward in favour of it, before considering Blake's argument. Thereafter, I show how Blake's example of race differs significantly from selection based on skills, in part due to the nature of identification with race and skills. However, I argue that the effects of skills-based selection on domestic population also need to be considered in any normative argument proposing such migration regulations. These effects include changes in our evaluations of equality and citizenship, negative impact on the social bases of self-respect, as well as specific disadvantages for segments of society and a negative effect on social mobility.

The ”foreign” virus?

“…The argument would run along roughly two lines: how border closures lead to damaging exclusionary nationalism and how they destroy social cohesion. We also argue in that earlier draft that interesting parallels exist with the works of Blake (2002), Egan (2020) and Cabrera (2020), as well as with the empirical data in Elias and others (2021). We thank our reviewers for convincing us that such a consequentialist argument needs to be expanded before it can be published in its own right.…”