How much do developing countries benefit from foreign investment? We contribute to this question by comparing the employment and wage practices of foreign and domestic firms in Brazil, using detailed matched firm-worker panel data. In order to control for unobserved worker differences, we examine both foreign acquisitions and divestments and worker mobility, including the joint estimation of firm and worker fixed effects. We find that changes in ownership do not tend to affect wages significantly, a result that holds both at the worker-and firm-levels. However, divestments are related to large job cuts, unlike acquisitions. On the other hand, movers from foreign to domestic firms take larger wage cuts than movers from domestic to foreign firms. Moreover, on average, the fixed effects of foreign firms are considerably larger than those of domestic firms, while worker selection effects are relatively small.
O objetivo deste trabalho é fornecer evidências empíricas para a hipótese de diferenciais compensatórios de salários para a indústria brasileira de transformação. O argumento básico é o de que indústrias que expõem seus trabalhadores a maiores riscos de acidentes de trabalho deveriam compensá-los com maiores salários. Os resultados obtidos neste trabalho corroboram os fatos estilizados da literatura, ou seja, a ausência do controle da heterogeneidade não observada dos trabalhadores subestima fortemente os valores dos prêmios compensatórios e, após tal controle, a hipótese de diferenciais compensatórios é amplamente corroborada. The aim of this paper is to provide empirical evidences of compensating wage differentials for Brazilian manufacturing firms. This theory states that higher injury risk industries would pay higher wages in order to attract workers - it implies a tradeoff between wages and job amenities. The empirical evidences of this paper are similar to stylized facts of the literature: omitted variables bias provides underestimated values for the injury risks coefficient, but after controlling the unobserved heterogeneity of workers the coefficient becomes positive and significant
O objetivo deste trabalho é testar o modelo de salário eficiência (shirking version) para o caso das indústrias brasileiras. Esta versão do modelo de salário eficiência prescreve a existência de uma relação negativa entre salários e intensidade de supervisão. Ao contrário dos artigos empíricos já desenvolvidos para o caso brasileiro (onde a intensidade de supervisão é medida pelo tamanho da firma), este artigo utiliza a variável span of control (razão supervisores/ supervisionados) como proxy para intensidade de supervisão. A hipótese de salário eficiência é corroborada empiricamente neste trabalho.
The main goal of this paper is to test the shirking version of the efficiency wage model for the Brazilian industries' case. This model states that there exists a negative relationship between wages and intensity of supervision, or a tradeoff between internal and external supervision. Different from other empirical papers developed for the Brazilian case, this paper uses the span of control (supervision/staff ratio) -rather than size of firms -as proxy
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