Bayesian Inference, Decision Theory, hypothesis test, loss functions, 62C10, 62A15, 62F15, 62F03,

No abstract

Simultaneous hypothesis tests can fail to provide results that meet logical requirements. For example, if A and B are two statements such that A implies B, there exist tests that, based on the same data, reject B but not A. Such outcomes are generally inconvenient to statisticians (who want to communicate the results to practitioners in a simple fashion) and non-statisticians (confused by conflicting pieces of information). Based on this inconvenience, one might want to use tests that satisfy logical requirements. However, Izbicki and Esteves shows that the only tests that are in accordance with three logical requirements (monotonicity, invertibility and consonance) are trivial tests based on point estimation, which generally lack statistical optimality. As a possible solution to this dilemma, this paper adapts the above logical requirements to agnostic tests, in which one can accept, reject or remain agnostic with respect to a given hypothesis. Each of the logical requirements is characterized in terms of a Bayesian decision theoretic perspective. Contrary to the results obtained for regular hypothesis tests, there exist agnostic tests that satisfy all logical requirements and also perform well statistically. In particular, agnostic tests that fulfill all logical requirements are characterized as region estimator-based tests. Examples of such tests are provided.

Abstract:The main objective of this paper is to find the relation between the adaptive significance level presented here and the sample size. We statisticians know of the inconsistency, or paradox, in the current classical tests of significance that are based on p-value statistics that are compared to the canonical significance levels (10%, 5%, and 1%): "Raise the sample to reject the null hypothesis" is the recommendation of some ill-advised scientists! This paper will show that it is possible to eliminate this problem of significance tests. We present here the beginning of a larger research project. The intention is to extend its use to more complex applications such as survival analysis, reliability tests, and other areas. The main tools used here are the Bayes factor and the extended Neyman-Pearson Lemma.

This paper introduces pragmatic hypotheses and relates this concept to the spiral of scientific evolution. Previous works determined a characterization of logically consistent statistical hypothesis tests and showed that the modal operators obtained from this test can be represented in the hexagon of oppositions. However, despite the importance of precise hypothesis in science, they cannot be accepted by logically consistent tests. Here, we show that this dilemma can be overcome by the use of pragmatic versions of precise hypotheses. These pragmatic versions allow a level of imprecision in the hypothesis that is small relative to other experimental conditions. The introduction of pragmatic hypotheses allows the evolution of scientific theories based on statistical hypothesis testing to be interpreted using the narratological structure of hexagonal spirals, as defined by Pierre Gallais.

Although logical consistency is desirable in scientific research, standard statistical hypothesis tests are typically logically inconsistent. To address this issue, previous work introduced agnostic hypothesis tests and proved that they can be logically consistent while retaining statistical optimality properties. This article characterizes the credal modalities in agnostic hypothesis tests and uses the hexagon of oppositions to explain the logical relations between these modalities. Geometric solids that are composed of hexagons of oppositions illustrate the conditions for these modalities to be logically consistent. Prisms composed of hexagons of oppositions show how the credal modalities obtained from two agnostic tests vary according to their threshold values. Nested hexagons of oppositions summarize logical relations between the credal modalities in these tests and prove new relations.

No abstract

This work addresses an important issue regarding the performance of simultaneous test procedures: the construction of multiple tests that at the same time are optimal from a statistical perspective and that also yield logically-consistent results that are easy to communicate to practitioners of statistical methods. For instance, if hypothesis A implies hypothesis B, is it possible to create optimal testing procedures that reject A whenever they reject B? Unfortunately, several standard testing procedures fail in having such logical consistency. Although this has been deeply investigated under a frequentist perspective, the literature lacks analyses under a Bayesian paradigm. In this work, we contribute to the discussion by investigating three rational relationships under a Bayesian decision-theoretic standpoint: coherence, invertibility and union consonance. We characterize and illustrate through simple examples optimal Bayes tests that fulfill each of these requisites separately. We also explore how far one can go by putting these requirements together. We show that although fairly intuitive tests satisfy both coherence and invertibility, no Bayesian testing scheme meets the desiderata as a whole, strengthening the understanding that logical consistency cannot be combined with statistical optimality in general. Finally, we associate Bayesian hypothesis testing with Bayes point estimation procedures. We prove the performance of logically-consistent hypothesis testing by means of a Bayes point estimator to be optimal only under very restrictive conditions. Entropy 2015, 17 6535