Wittgenstein zitiert in seinen Schriften nur wenige Autoren, den amerikanischen Pragmatisten William James bis in sein Spätwerk hinein jedoch mit auffallender Häufigkeit. Das hängt - so die Leitthese des Beitrags - vor allem mit der Rolle zusammen, die James‘ Erkundungen des Religiösen für Wittgensteins Nachdenken über Religion spielen. Der intrikaten Verbindung Wittgenstein-James wird in sieben Reflexionen nachgegangen: 1. Krisis der Lebenspraxis: „The Sick Soul“ (James, Tolstoi, Wittgenstein); 2. Das existentiell dimensionierte „Paradoxon“ als rektifizierte/dekonstruierte Dialektik? Wittgensteins (beredtes?) Schweigen im Tractatus; 3. Kann Reflexion stillgestellt werden? „Therapie“ als „Ende der Philosophie“? 4. Kritische Eindämmung des „Szientismus“: Wittgensteins und James‘ Einsprüche gegen die „survival theory of religion“; 5. Exkurs zum Jamesschen Thematisierungsversuch des „Mystischen“; 6. James und Wittgenstein über das „institutionalisierte“ Religiöse: „Religion - a matter between me and God only“? - „Subjektive“ Religiosität vs. „korporative“ Religion; 7. Coda. Die (innere) Ambivalenz religiöser Motivation: Sami Pihlströms (post‐) Wittgensteinsche Reflexionen.
Are computers on the way to acquiring “superintelligence”? Can human deliberation and decision-making be fully simulated by the mechanical execution of AI programmes? On close examination these expectations turn out not to be well-founded, since algorithms (or, in Kantian terms, “imperatives of skill” that are implemented by technological means) do, ultimately, have “heteronomous” characteristics. So-called AI-“autonomy” is a sensor-directed performance automatism, which — compared with the potential for ethical judgment in human “practical reason” — proves to be limited in significant ways (even if, in so-called “machine learning”, digital technologies are able to probabilistically adapt to new data). This is shown in some detail with reference to the idea of a “digital humanism”, which was introduced by Julian Nida-Rümelin and Nathalie Weidenfeld, who argue that algorithms (possibly) are useful “tools”, but emphasise — thus rejecting excessive “post-humanist” (Utopian or dystopian) ideas about AI — that there exists a crucial difference between human action and its (partial) AI-simulation. While Nida-Rümelin/Weidenfeld´s “digital humanism” is, on the one hand, inspired by Kant’s conception of human autonomous self-determination, the concept of “structural rationality” that they advocate is, on the other hand, quite problematic. “Digital humanism”, however, can be improved as I argue — with reference to Barbara Herman’s analysis of “moral judgment” and to Allen Wood’s reflections on “human dignity”.
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