The existence of collective reputation implies an important externality. Among firms trading internationally, quality shocks about one firms products could affect the demand of other firms from the same origin country. We study such reputation spillover in the context of a large-scale scandal that affected the Chinese dairy industry in 2008. Leveraging detailed firm-product level administrative data and official quality inspection reports, we document sizable reputation spillovers on uncontaminated firms. We further investigate potential mechanisms that could mediate the strength of collective reputation, including information accuracy, observability of the supply chain and prior export experience.

Collective reputation implies an important externality. Among firms trading internationally, quality shocks about one firm's products could affect the demand of other firms from the same origin country. We study this issue in the context of a large-scale scandal that affected the Chinese dairy industry in 2008. Leveraging rich firm-product level administrative data and official quality inspection reports, we find that the export revenue of contaminated firms dropped by 84% after the scandal, relative to the national industrial trend, and the spillover effect on noncontaminated firms is measured at 64% of the direct effect. Notably, firms deemed innocent by government inspections did not fare any better than noninspected firms. These findings highlight the importance of collective reputation in international trade and the challenges governments might face in signaling quality and restoring trust. Finally, we investigate potential mechanisms that could mediate the strength of the reputation spillover. We find that the spillover effects are smaller in destinations where people have better information about parties involved in the scandal. New firms are more vulnerable to the collective reputation damage than established firms. Supply chain structure matters especially in settings where firms are less vertically integrated and exhibit fragmented upstream-downstream relationships.

The version presented here is a Working Paper (or 'pre-print') that may be later published elsewhere.

In response to the historic 2011-2017 California drought, local governments enacted a raft of conservation policies and little is known about which ones explain the sharp decline in residential water consumption. To answer this question, we use a novel data set of hourly water consumption data for over 82,300 households in Fresno, California where water consumption declined by nearly a third and have three main findings. First, we estimate the price elasticity of demand for water to be 0.16 for marginal rates and 0.39 for average rates. Second, reducing the number of days where outdoor watering is allowable from 3 to 2 substantially decreases water use, despite the availability of opportunities to substitute between permitted and non-permitted hours, days, and seasons. Third, "bully pulpit" pronouncements about the water crisis increased public awareness of drought conditions but did not contribute to water savings. Overall, higher water prices explain 40-44% of the changes in residential water use observed during our sample period in Fresno and reductions in the number of days when outdoor watering is allowable explain 45-51% of these changes. However, the absence of experimental or quasi-experimental variation in these policies means that we interpret this associational evidence cautiously.

No abstract

The version presented here is a Working Paper (or 'pre-print') that may be later published elsewhere.

I study the determinants of childhood lead screening using all Illinois birth records (2001)(2002)(2003)(2004)(2005)(2006)(2007)(2008)(2009)(2010)(2011)(2012)(2013)(2014), matched to lead testing records and geocoded housing age data. Housing age measures lead risk, as older houses disproportionally have lead paint. Changes in providers' availability, inferred from testing data, provide variation in non-monetary costs of testing. Travel costs reduce screening among low-and high-risk households alike. Thus, self-selection based on travel costs does not appear to improve targeting, even though high-risk households are willing to pay $29-389 more than low-risk households for screening. Screening incentives would be cost-effective for reasonable values of lead poisoning externalities.

Objectives. To evaluate how lowering the blood lead level (BLL) intervention threshold affects childhood lead testing policy. Methods. We geocoded 4.19 million Illinois lead testing records (2001–2016) and linked to 2.37 million birth records (2001–2014), data on housing age, industrial emissions, and roads. We used multinomial logistic regression to determine predictors of BLLs of 10 micrograms per deciliter (µg/dL) or greater, 5 to 9 µg/dL, and 4 µg/dL. Results. We found that 2.2% of children had BLLs of 10 µg/dL or greater, 8.9% had BLLs of 5 to 9 µg/dL, and 5.7% had BLLs of 4 µg/dL. Pre-1930 housing was associated with more than 2- to 4-fold increased relative risk of BLLs above all thresholds. Housing built in 1951 to 1978 was associated with increased relative risk of BLLs of 5 to 9 µg/dL (relative risk ratio [RRR] = 1.14; 95% confidence interval [CI] = 1.06, 1.21) but not with increased relative risk of BLLs of 10 µg/dL or greater (RRR = 0.99; 95% CI = 0.84, 1.16). At a given address, previous BLLs of 5 to 9 µg/dL or BLLs of 10 µg/dL or greater were associated with increased risk of BLLs of 5 to 9 µg/dL or BLLs of 10 µg/dL or greater among current occupants by 2.37- (95% CI = 2.20, 2.54) fold and 4.08- (95% CI = 3.69, 4.52) fold, respectively. Conclusions. The relative importance of determinants of above-threshold BLLs changes with decreasing intervention thresholds. Public Health Implications. States may need to update lead screening guidelines when decreasing the intervention threshold.