This paper develops an analytical approach to comparative political economy that focuses on the relative importance of different components of aggregate demand—in the first instance, exports and household consumption—and dynamic relations among the “demand drivers” of growth. We illustrate this approach by comparing patterns of economic growth in Germany, Italy, Sweden, and the United Kingdom over the period 1994–2007. Our discussion emphasizes that export-led growth and consumption-led growth have different implications for distributive conflict.

The view that unemployment is caused by labor market rigidities and should be addressed through systematic institutional deregulation has gained broad currency and has been embraced by national and international policymaking agencies alike. It is unclear, however, whether there really is robust empirical support for such conclusions. This article engages in an econometric analysis comparing several estimators and specifications. It does not find much robust evidence either of labor market institutions' direct effects on unemployment rate, or of a more indirect impact through the magnitude of adverse shocks. At the same time, we find little support for the opposite, proregulatory position as well: the estimates show a robust positive relationship between union density and unemployment rates; also, there is no robust evidence that the within-country variation of bargaining coordination is associated with lower unemployment (as frequently argued), nor is it clear that bargaining coordination moderates the impact of other institutions. All in all, restrictive monetary policies enacted from an independent central bank and other determinants of real interest rates appear to play a more important role in explaining unemployment than institutional factors.Many thanks to participants in the 2d CofFEE Europe Workshop, as well as Peter Auer, Emilio Castilla, Rob Franzese, Andrew Glyn, Lane Kenworthy, Bernhard Kittel, Stephen Nickell, Michael Piore, Naren Prasad, and Marco Vivarelli for comments on previous versions of this article

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One important common theme of our five-country research is that all union movements see political engagement as essential in their efforts at revitalization. Specific forms of political action, however, vary according to national context. If unions find or build adequate political and institutional supports, they have less incentive to mobilize the membership, organize the unorganized, build coalitions with other groups, or give support to grass-roots initiatives. The irony is that a strong institutional position can reduce incentives to organize, which may be essential to sustain long-term influence; yet organizing unions in America and Britain are hard pressed to sustain gains in the absence of adequate institutional supports

This article examines the emergence and institutionalization of social pacts in Ireland, Italy and South Korea. It argues that pacts emerge as deals between a weak government faced with a political–economic crisis and the more moderate sections of the trade union movement, and are institutionalized when (and if) organized employers come to support them fully. The unions become strategically committed to a social pact if the moderate factions prevail over the radical. Decision-making rules bringing the preferences of the rank-and-file to bear on the process of organizational decision-making seem to help the moderate union factions. The robustness of the analysis is tested by examining briefly a number of counterfactual cases

The authors address the long-standing mystery of stable individual differences in negotiation performance, on which intuition and conventional wisdom have clashed with inconsistent empirical findings. The present study used the Social Relations Model to examine individual differences directly via consistency in performance across multiple negotiations and to disentangle the roles of both parties within these inherently dyadic interactions. Individual differences explained a substantial 46% of objective performance and 19% of subjective performance in a mixed-motive bargaining exercise. Previous work may have understated the influence of individual differences because conventional research designs require specific traits to be identified and measured. Exploratory analyses of a battery of traits revealed few reliable associations with consistent individual differences in objective performance-except for positive beliefs about negotiation, positive affect, and concern for one's outcome, each of which predicted better performance. Findings suggest that the field has large untapped potential to explain substantial individual differences. Limitations, areas for future research, and practical implications are discussed. Publisher's Disclaimer: This is a PDF file of an unedited manuscript that has been accepted for publication. As a service to our customers we are providing this early version of the manuscript. The manuscript will undergo copyediting, typesetting, and review of the resulting proof before it is published in its final citable form. Please note that during the production process errors may be discovered which could affect the content, and all legal disclaimers that apply to the journal pertain. Keywords NIH Public Access NIH-PA Author ManuscriptA long-standing mystery within the field of negotiation-a mutual decision-making process to allocate scarce resources (Pruitt, 1983)-is the influence of individual differences on performance. Conventional wisdom suggests that some people seem more adept, natural, comfortable, and successful at negotiating. Differences in skill seem so vast that students often question whether they are innate or acquired (Kray & Haselhuhn, 2007). Indeed, the strong intuition that some negotiators are better than others resonates with theoretical perspectives in psychology on the pervasive influence of enduring personal dispositions on interpersonal behavior (Sternberg & Dobson, 1987;Thompson, 1990b).However, empirical research has been less than compelling in validating this common wisdom. Large-scale reviews have long concluded that individual differences are unreliable predictors of negotiation outcomes, resulting in a preponderance of null and inconsistent results (Lewicki, Litterer, Minton, & Saunders, 1994;Terhune, 1970;Thompson, 1990b). Previous authors have gone so far as to conclude that "personality and individual differences appear to play a minimal role in determining bargaining behavior" (Thompson, 1990b, p. 515). Given these conclusions, negotiation researchers...

This article proposes a new interpretation of the evolution of German industrial relations focusing on the interaction between macroeconomic dynamics and industrial relations developments and specifically on 'growth models'. It argues that there has been a shift in the German growth model from growth pulled by net exports and consumption simultaneously to almost exclusively export-led growth. In addition, exports of machinery and transportation equipment have become more pricesensitive, implying that wage and price increases now pose a greater threat to growth than in the past. These macroeconomic developments have spurred a set of adjustments in the industrial relations sphere with export-oriented firms seeking cost reductions and liberalizations. Industrial relations changes have in turn contributed to entrench export-led growth by augmenting the systemic importance of the foreign sector and reducing the relevance of domestic demand. The export sector has thrived at the expense of real wage stagnation, particularly (but not exclusively) in labour-intensive service sectors, and pattern bargaining has lost its ability to redistribute across sectors and boost domestic demand. The new German model is much leaner and meaner than in the past. Contrary to recent literature, its erosion and liberalization are not limited to the service periphery but affect the manufacturing core as well.Key words: Germany, industrial relations, institutional change, varieties of capitalism, growth models JEL classification: P16 political economy, E02 institutions and the macroeconomy, J52 collective bargaining

This article makes three interrelated arguments: first, the sovereign debt crisis is more complex than a simple story about fiscally irresponsible governments which now are being forced by international financial markets to tighten their belts. Ultimately, it is the result of a political decision to create a currency union among economically non-homogenous countries without making any provision for the use of democratically legitimated fiscal transfers to correct asymmetric shocks. Second, the internal devaluation policy which is being imposed on Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain is ineffective and counterproductive. Internal devaluation depresses growth, and the absence of growth requires further austerity for government to regain their fiscal credibility, thus generating a vicious cycle. Third, while national governments continue to be held electorally accountable by citizens, they have lost any meaningful ability to choose among alternative policy options and, as a result, implement everywhere pretty much the same, deeply unpopular austerity package. This situation threatens not just the future viability of the Euro but of the European project as a whole.