Are some negotiators better than others? Individual differences in bargaining outcomes

Abstract

The authors address the long-standing mystery of stable individual differences in negotiation performance, on which intuition and conventional wisdom have clashed with inconsistent empirical findings. The present study used the Social Relations Model to examine individual differences directly via consistency in performance across multiple negotiations and to disentangle the roles of both parties within these inherently dyadic interactions. Individual differences explained a substantial 46% of objective performance and 19% of subjective performance in a mixed-motive bargaining exercise. Previous work may have understated the influence of individual differences because conventional research designs require specific traits to be identified and measured. Exploratory analyses of a battery of traits revealed few reliable associations with consistent individual differences in objective performance-except for positive beliefs about negotiation, positive affect, and concern for one's outcome, each of which predicted better performance. Findings suggest that the field has large untapped potential to explain substantial individual differences. Limitations, areas for future research, and practical implications are discussed. Publisher's Disclaimer: This is a PDF file of an unedited manuscript that has been accepted for publication. As a service to our customers we are providing this early version of the manuscript. The manuscript will undergo copyediting, typesetting, and review of the resulting proof before it is published in its final citable form. Please note that during the production process errors may be discovered which could affect the content, and all legal disclaimers that apply to the journal pertain. Keywords NIH Public Access NIH-PA Author ManuscriptA long-standing mystery within the field of negotiation-a mutual decision-making process to allocate scarce resources (Pruitt, 1983)-is the influence of individual differences on performance. Conventional wisdom suggests that some people seem more adept, natural, comfortable, and successful at negotiating. Differences in skill seem so vast that students often question whether they are innate or acquired (Kray & Haselhuhn, 2007). Indeed, the strong intuition that some negotiators are better than others resonates with theoretical perspectives in psychology on the pervasive influence of enduring personal dispositions on interpersonal behavior (Sternberg & Dobson, 1987;Thompson, 1990b).However, empirical research has been less than compelling in validating this common wisdom. Large-scale reviews have long concluded that individual differences are unreliable predictors of negotiation outcomes, resulting in a preponderance of null and inconsistent results (Lewicki, Litterer, Minton, & Saunders, 1994;Terhune, 1970;Thompson, 1990b). Previous authors have gone so far as to conclude that "personality and individual differences appear to play a minimal role in determining bargaining behavior" (Thompson, 1990b, p. 515). Given these conclusions, negotiation researchers...

The Polarizing Effect of Arousal on Negotiation

“…We reasoned that participants would construe their own arousal as negative or positive affect, depending on their prior attitudes, and that this negative or positive affect, in turn, would drive economic performance. This logic is supported by past research demonstrating that positive affect is associated not only with higher subjective value but also with higher objective outcomes (e.g., Elfenbein et al, 2008).…”

“…To test our interaction hypothesis, we regressed subjective value on arousal, prior attitudes, and the interaction of arousal with prior attitudes. We also included a control variable for whether English was the participant's native language because past research POLARIZING EFFECT OF AROUSAL 9 has found this variable to have an effect on subjective value (Elfenbein, Curhan, Eisenkraft, Shirako, & Baccaro, 2008). We found a significant interaction between arousal and prior attitudes,  = .46, t(77) = 2.83, p = .006.…”

Effects of Implicit Negotiation Beliefs and Moral Disengagement on Negotiator Attitudes and Deceptive Behavior

“…This is because, despite the ''strong situation'' (Mischel 1977) faced by a negotiator, there still remains plenty of room for variance in individual behavior, such as how to respond to a counterpart's offer, how to substantiate one's own claims, and whether or not to do so truthfully. Thus, based on our results, we concur with Elfenbein et al (2008) that the ''death knell for the effect of individual differences on negotiation outcomes may be premature'' (p. 1464). This study also strongly supports the argument that moral disengagement is a precursor to ethically ambiguous acts.…”

Some Ethical Implications of Individual Competitiveness

“…Machiavellianism is a personality trait exemplified by the cynical ''cool syndrome'' (Christie and Geis 1970), which suggests a calculating rationality little influenced by emotions, interpersonal attachments, empathy, or altruism (Carnahan and McFarland 2007;De Corte et al 2007;Locke and Christensen 2007;Wastell and Booth 2003), and thus questionable ethics. Machiavellians seem inclined to be disagreeable (Elfenbein et al 2008), mistrusting (Sakalaki and Richardson et al 2007), not conscientious (Schlenker 2008 , Table S1), uncooperative (Paal and Bereczkei 2007), emotionally manipulative (Austin et al 2007), exploitive in relationships (Mullins and Kopelman 1988), and have been observed to lie, cheat, and bend rules for personal advantage (e.g., Kashy and DePaulo 1996;McLeod and Genereux 2008;Schlenker 2008). Specific examples of such dubious ethics among Machiavellians are beliefs that bribes produce good customer relations (Ross and Robertson 2003), that performance appraisals may need to be falsified for political reasons (Tziner et al 1996), and that any trusting behaviors displayed by opponents in a negotiation should be exploited (Sakalaki and Kazi et al 2007;Sakalaki and Richardson et al 2007).…”