The authors elaborate the complications and the opportunities inherent in the statistical analysis of small-group data. They begin by discussing nonindependence of group members' scores and then consider standard methods for the analysis of small-group data and determine that these methods do not take into account this nonindependence. A new method is proposed that uses multilevel modeling and allows for negative nonindependence and mutual influence. Finally, the complications of interactions, different group sizes, and differential effects are considered. The authors strongly urge that the analysis model of data from small-group studies should mirror the psychological processes that generate those data.

Theory and research are presented relating the need for cognitive closure to major facets of group behavior. It is suggested that a high need for closure, whether it is based on members' disposition or the situation, contributes to the emergence of a behavioral syndrome describable as group-centrism--a pattern that includes pressures to opinion uniformity, encouragement of autocratic leadership, in-group favoritism, rejection of deviates, resistance to change, conservatism, and the perpetuation of group norms. These theoretical predictions are borne out by laboratory and field research in diverse settings.

A force-field theory of motivated cognition is presented and applied to a broad variety of phenomena in social judgment and self-regulation. Purposeful cognitive activity is assumed to be propelled by a driving force and opposed by a restraining force. Potential driving force represents the maximal amount of energy an individual is prepared to invest in a cognitive activity. Effective driving force corresponds to the amount of energy he or she actually invests in attempt to match the restraining force. Magnitude of the potential driving force derives from a combination of goal importance and the pool of available mental resources, whereas magnitude of the restraining force derives from an individual's inclination to conserve resources, current task demands, and competing goals. The present analysis has implications for choice of means to achieve one's cognitive goals as well as for successful goal attainment under specific force-field constellations. Empirical evidence for these effects is considered, and the underlying theory's integrative potential is highlighted. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).

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We are indebted to Carol Dweck, Mario Mikulincer and Tory Higgins for comments on an earlier draft. AbstractThis chapter features the concept of ascribed epistemic authority (Kruglanski, 1989) offered as a unique perspective on source effects in social judgment. In contrast to prior approaches that viewed the source of communication as external to the self, we assume that both the self and external sources may be assigned different degrees of epistemic authority in different domains, and that this determines how individuals process information, make decisions and undertake actions. The present framework traces the socio-developmental aspects of epistemic authority assignments, and considers individual differences in the distribution of authority assignments across sources. From this perspective, we claim a central role in human judgment to the information's source, and the assessment of its epistemic authority is seen to constitute an essential preliminary phase in individuals' approach to information.

S. L. Neuberg, T. N. Judice, and S. G. West (1997) faulted our work with the Need for Closure Scale (NFCS) on grounds that the NFCS lacks discriminant validity relative to S. L. Neuberg's and J. T. Newsom's (1993) Personal Need for Structure (PNS) Scale and is multidimensional, which, so they claim, renders the use of its total score inadmissible. By contrast, the present authors show that neither of the above assertions is incompatible with the underlying need for closure theory. Relations between NFCS and the PNS are to be expected, as these were designed to operationalize the very same construct (of need for closure). Furthermore, no unidimensionality of the NFCS has been claimed, and none is required to use its total score for testing various theoretically derived predictions. An instrument's ultimate utility hinges on theoretical considerations and empirical evidence rather than on questionable psychometric dogma unrelated to the substantive matters at hand.

Four studies explored the relation between members' need for cognitive closure and their feelings toward groups. It was found that high (vs. low) need for closure individuals liked in-groups and out-groups more as function of the degree to which their membership was perceived as homogeneous (Studies 1-4), provided it was also self-similar (Studies 3 and 4). These results are discussed in terms of the relation between need for closure and homogeneous (vs. heterogeneous) groups' apparent potential as "closure providers."

This study was designed to compare the factor structure of Need for Closure Scale (NFCS) as it emerges from three European samples (Croatia, Italy and The Netherlands) to the structure emerging from a USA sample, and to test the invariance of the structure of the scale both across three European contexts and across European and US samples. This comparison was conducted to examine the generalizability of results obtained with the NFCS across cultures. The sample sizes employed in this study range from 201 (Croatia) to 418 (Italy) participants. First- and second-order confirmatory factor analysis and multiple-group measurement invariance tests were performed using the LISREL-8 program (Jöreskog and Sörbom, 1993). The analyses revealed that the factor structure of the scale was invariant across all samples, and that the best fitting model was one with two latent second-order factors, thus confirming results of previous studies (Kruglanski et al., 1997; Neuberg, Judice, & West, 1997).