No abstract

William James made a distinction between coarse and noncoarse emotions. In the present article, we explore the nature of such noncoarse emotions, which we designate as emotions with refinement. We take our cue from the treatment of refined emotions in Chinese poetics and philosophy. The theory and description of savoring(in Chinese, p'in-wei) points to several features of emotion experiences and behavior that are usually absent in direct emotional responses to emotional events, such as self-reflexivity and higher level second-order awareness, detachment, and restraint. Emotions with those features can be found outside savoring and aesthetic contexts, for instance while dealing with actual life events. It appears both feasible and illuminating to analyze such emotion experiences and behavior in terms of current emotion theory, notably by means of the constructs of appraisal and action readiness. Emotions with refinement thus fit general emotion theory while also possessing distinctive character within the motion domain. Our analysis has implications for the structure of emotion experience and the study of consciousness.

A hallmark of Christian mysticism is negative theology, which refers to the school of thought that gives prominence to negation in reference to God. By denying the possibility to name God, negative theology cuts at the very root of our cognitive makeup-the human impulse to name and put things into categories-and thereby situates us "halfway between a 'no longer' and a 'not yet'" (Iser, 1978, p. 213), a temporality in which "the past is negated, but. .. the present is not yet formulated" (Iser, 1978, p. 217). The affective corollary of this "no longer" and "not yet" state is the "dark night of the soul" that mystics are known to have bouts of. One particular variant of the "dark night of the soul" is awe, which will be the focus of this paper. My investigation starts with an introduction to the two primary themes of negative theology-negativity and self-reflexivity, followed by a critique of Keltner and Haidt's model of awe, which is compared with Rudolf Otto's phenomenology of mysticism in general and religious awe in particular. In the concluding section, I examine the relevance of religious awe to contemporary life on the one hand, and to emotion research on the other. The soul's greatness takes its measure from its capacity to achieve the flaming vision by which the soul becomes at home in pain. (Heidegger, 1971, p. 18.)

An empirically based version of the good life as proposed by positive psychology is a donut with something missing at the core-the moral map. This paper addresses ramifications of this lacuna, and suggests ways to narrow the gap between science and life. By applying an extended version of the self-regulation theory of Higgins to a cross cultural analysis of the good life as envisioned by Seligman and Confucius, respectively, this paper sheds light on the culturally encapsulated value judgments behind positive psychology, examines issues at stake in an empirically based version of the good life, and suggests, for future research, alternative approaches that may better fulfill the promises of positive psychology. HAPPINESS DONUT: A CONFUCIAN CRITIQUE OF POSITIVE PSYCHOLOGYPositive psychology has two versions, strong and weak. The weak version claims that we can benefit from studying the so far neglected "positive" attributes of life. Except for its overly simplistic polarization of the positive and the negative (see Solomon & Stone, 2002), this claim is rather innocuous. But at the same time it cannot be taken seriously as an innovation in science. If the whole thing is a matter of shuffling research agendas, then the pendulum is bound to swing back to the negative, when in the foreseeable future the positive side of the coin has generated silos of data. The strong version of positive psychology is more interesting, as it goes beyond another round of the pendulum.The strong version of positive psychology is best expressed by Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi in their definitive statement of the movement (2000), in which they urged "social and behavioral sciences" to "articulate a vision of the good life that is empirically sound" (p. 5). This claim is bold and innovative, but problematic. To the extent that * Thanks are due James R. Averill for his helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

This article introduces the expanded network theory and demonstrates the heuristic value of its construct of strong-ties and weak-ties rationalities. This construct is derived from the network theory of Granovetter and corroborated with evolutionary biology and psychological studies on group processes. This construct has wide-ranging implications and applications for cultural and cross-cultural psychology. It informs our efforts toward cultural sensitivity in theory and research design and offers a new tool for cultural analysis. In particular, it can serve as a useful framework to investigate cultures in transition in the globalizing era. Insights into strong-ties and weak-ties rationalities may even contribute to shaping the future of the human society.

No abstract

In this article, I argue that indigenous psychology (IP) is in a unique position to contribute to the making of a more equitable global psychology for the 21st century, if it can successfully negotiate between its 2 commitments-local and global-thereby creating a sustained dialogue among IPs around the globe. Using Hwang's (2019) position paper as illustration, I analyze the successes and failures of this trajectory from local to global and conclude with a proposed set of standards for scholarship in IP that can facilitate the dialogue among IPs as a global community. Public Significance StatementThis article calls for an international dialogue among indigenous psychologies to move the field forward toward more active participation in the shaping of the global psychology of tomorrow.

No abstract