Investments in human capital can create a hold-up problem whereby both employers and employees exploit the bargaining weaknesses of the other. Employee share ownership (ESO) can mitigate this hold-up problem because it can align interests, develop loyalty, signal good-will and lock in employees. Previous studies have shown positive relationships between company investments in human capital and the use of ESO consistent with this argument but have been unable to identify the direction of causality. Using panel data from the French REPONSE survey, the findings indicate that significant and continuous investments in human capital take place prior to the implementation of ESO.

This article explores the country of origin effects of private equity investment on employment in France. Using propensity score matching methodology applied to establishment‐level survey data, we find that foreign investors are significantly more likely to induce job shedding and employment insecurity than are French investors. As suggested by the literature on comparative capitalism, national differences may persist in conjunction with commonalities and trends in global capitalism.

This is a study of the effects of alternative investors on a range of work and employment practices in France, paying specific attention to whether investors are indigenous or not. We use data from a detailed survey of French firms, and set our research in the context of the literature on comparative capitalisms. We find that private equity (PE) investments from abroad are associated with greater job insecurity, less spending on training and lower wages, but French PE investments are not. We explore the reasons behind this variation and the implications for theory and practice.

S’il existe de nombreux travaux portant sur les conséquences de l’épargne salariale sur la performance des entreprises, peu de recherches depuis les premières (Gregg, Machin, 1988 ; Cheadle, 1989 ; Kruse, 1991 ; Cahuc, Dormont, 1992) se sont intéressées aux déterminants de ces pratiques, alors qu’elles se sont largement diversifiées et diffusées, faisant désormais partie du mix-rémunération des entreprises. Dans une optique largement exploratoire, une analyse statistique a été menée sur un échantillon de 1131 entreprises françaises et a permis tout d’abord d’identifier cinq profils de pratiques d’épargne salariale, en fonction de l’existence ou non de dispositifs d’épargne salariale (existence d’un accord de participation, d’un accord d’intéressement et/ou d’un plan d’épargne entreprise) et de l’intensité des pratiques (importance des montants des versements volontaires des salariés et de l’abondement de l’entreprise). Dans un second temps, s’appuyant sur une revue de la littérature, l’étude s’est intéressée aux déterminants externes et internes de ces profils. L’objectif est ainsi de mieux comprendre la cohérence de ces combinaisons de pratiques d’épargne salariale entre elles et par rapport au contexte externe et interne des entreprises dans une perspective contingente et configurationnelle. Au-delà d’une meilleure connaissance de ce complément de rémunération, les résultats de cette étude peuvent apporter un éclairage utile aux praticiens, responsables de la gestion des ressources humaines.

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between employee share ownership (ESO) and employer-provided training. To be more specific, as both ESO and involvement practices can contribute to developing human capital, the paper addresses the question of whether they are substitutes or complements in the relationship with training. Design/methodology/approach – The theoretical hypotheses are tested using the French nationally representative establishment-level survey, REPONSE, which is similar to the British WERS. The sample consists of 1,523 establishments. Findings – The results are consistent with studies conducted elsewhere (e.g. in the UK) and provide novel findings, thereby suggesting a complementarity between ESO and involvement practices with bundles of practices becoming increasingly more complex as training expenditures increase. Research limitations/implications – To provide further insights, future research that uses more precise information regarding ESO plans is needed. Practical implications – Results can provide HR managers with valuable information regarding the organisational characteristics necessary to ensure a fertile ground for their training expenses. Originality/value – The paper reflects a growing awareness that human capital development and share ownership plans may be related and that this relationship might be a more compelling explanation for share ownership plans than the standard agency theory. The contribution of ESO plans to the development of employee competencies may be at least as important as their possible effects on employee motivation and effort.