A viewer can extract many potential patterns from any set of visualized data values. But that means that two people can see different patterns in the same visualization, potentially leading to miscommunication. Here, we show that when people are primed to see one pattern in the data as visually salient, they believe that naïve viewers will experience the same visual salience. Participants were told one of multiple backstories about political events that affected public polling data, before viewing a graph that depicted those data. One pattern in the data was particularly visually salient to them given the backstory that they heard. They then predicted what naïve viewers would most visually salient on the visualization. They were strongly influenced by their own knowledge, despite explicit instructions to ignore it, predicting that others would find the same patterns to be most visually salient. This result reflects a psychological phenomenon known as the curse of knowledge, where an expert struggles to recreate the state of mind of a novice. The present findings show that the curse of knowledge also plagues the visual perception of data, explaining why people can fail to connect with audiences when they communicate patterns in data.

Comparing objects is a process necessary to cognitive tasks involving categorization. Shape is considered one of the primary vehicles for object categorization. We hypothesize that similarity in shape facilitates finding conceptual correspondences between objects, both for objects stemming from the same and from different conceptual categories. In the latter case, the comparison process requires the construction of an ad hoc category, which is also required when interpreting visual metaphors. We used three experimental tasks to investigate the role of shape in comparing objects: a similarity judgment task, a similarity rating task, and a production task. The results of our experiments support the hypothesis that an essential component of visual metaphor processing-comparing objects stemming from disparate conceptual domains-is positively affected by similarity in the objects' shape.

A viewer can extract many potential patterns from any set of visualized data values. But that means that two people can see different patterns in the same visualization, potentially leading to miscommunication. Here, we show that when people are primed to see one pattern in the data as visually salient, they believe that naïve viewers will experience the same visual salience. Participants were told one of multiple backstories about political events that affected public polling data, before viewing a graph that depicted those data. One pattern in the data was particularly visually salient to them given the backstory that they heard. They then predicted what naïve viewers would most visually salient on the visualization. They were strongly influenced by their own knowledge, despite explicit instructions to ignore it, predicting that others would find the same patterns to be most visually salient. This result reflects a psychological phenomenon known as the curse of knowledge, where an expert struggles to re-create the state of mind of a novice. The present findings show that the curse of knowledge also plagues the visual perception of data, explaining why people can fail to connect with audiences when they communicate patterns in data.

In order to interpret novel metaphoric relations, we have to construct ad hoc categories under which the metaphorically related concepts can be subsumed. Shape is considered to be one of the primary vehicles of object categorization. Accordingly, shape might play a prominent role in interpreting visual metaphors (i.e., two metaphorically related objects depicted in one visual array). This study explores the role of object shape in visual metaphor interpretation of 10- to 12-year-olds. The experiment shows that participants can produce more correspondences between similarly shaped objects as compared to dissimilarly shaped objects and that they need less thinking time to do so. These findings suggest that similarity in shape facilitates the process of interpreting visual metaphors.

People mentally represent the shapes of objects. For instance, the mental representation of an eagle is different when one thinks about a flying or resting eagle. This study examined the role of shape in mental representations of similes (i.e., metaphoric comparisons). We tested the prediction that when people process a simile they will mentally represent the entities of the comparison as having a similar shape. We conducted two experiments in which participants read sentences that either did (experimental sentences) or did not (control sentences) invite comparing two entities. For the experimental sentences, the ground of the comparison was explicit in Experiment 1 ("X has the ability to Z, just like Y") and implicit in Experiment 2 ("X is like Y"). After having read the sentence, participants were presented with line drawings of the two objects, which were either similarly or dissimilarly shaped. They judged whether both objects were mentioned in the preceding sentence. For the experimental sentences, recognition latencies were shorter for similarly shaped objects than for dissimilarly shaped objects. For the control sentences, we did not find such an effect of similarity in shape. These findings suggest that a perceptual symbol of shape is activated when processing similes.