Manuscript Type: EmpiricalResearch Question/Issue: Does corporate governance explain US bank performance during the period leading up to the financial crisis? We adopt the factor structure by Larcker, Richardson, and Tuna (2007) to measure multiple dimensions of corporate governance for 236 public commercial banks. Research Findings/Insights: Findings reveal corporate governance factors explain financial performance better than loan quality. We find strong support for a negative association between leverage and both financial performance and loan quality. CEO duality is negatively associated with financial performance. The extent of executive incentive pay is positively associated with financial performance but exhibits a negative association with loan quality in the long-run. We find a concave relationship between financial performance and both board size and average director age. We provide weak evidence of an association of anti-takeover devices, board meeting frequency, and affiliated nature of committees with financial performance. Theoretical/Academic Implications: We apply agency theory to the banking industry and expect that the governanceperformance linkage might differ due to the unique regulatory and business environment. Results extend Larcker et al. (2007), especially regarding the concave relationship between board size and performance, and the role of leverage. Given the lack of support for our agency theory predictions, we suggest that alternative theories are needed to understand the performance implications of corporate governance at banks. Practitioner/Policy Implications: We offer contributions to regulators, especially for ongoing financial reforms of capital requirements and executive compensation. Specifically, we show a consistent negative association between leverage and performance, which supports the current debate on Tier I capital limits for banks.

SUMMARY: There are many unanswered questions and concerns regarding the consequences of the fraud whistleblowing environment created by the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) and Dodd-Frank Acts. While SOX requires audit committees to implement anonymous internal reporting channels, the Dodd-Frank Act offers substantial monetary incentives that encourage reporting to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). To mitigate concerns that employees might bypass internal channels, some companies are considering offering internal whistleblowing incentives. However, it is unclear how internal incentives will affect employee whistleblowing behavior. We experimentally examine the impact of an internal incentive on employees' intentions to report fraud. Across treatments, we find a greater likelihood of reporting internally than to the SEC. Evidence strength interacts with the presence of an internal incentive such that SEC reporting intentions are greatest when evidence is strong and an internal incentive is present. When evidence is weak, the presence of an internal incentive decreases SEC reporting intentions. Data Availability: Data used in this study are available from the authors upon request.

This study extends research on the escalation of commitment phenomenon by investigating decision makers' tendency to look forward to project completion and develop anticipatory perceptions and emotions concerning goal attainment. We examine the influence of two project-specific predictors of escalation (level of progress and presence of an alternative project) on perceived uncertainty and the extent to which anticipatory emotions (i.e., current affective reactions to possible future events) mediate the influence of uncertainty on levels of commitment to a failing project. Results indicated that level of progress and the presence of an alternative project affected uncertainty, which influenced anticipatory emotions. Lower levels of uncertainty and higher levels of positive anticipatory emotions increased the tendency to escalate commitment.