We review and summarize accounting literature that examines whistleblowing in the accounting context. We organize our review around the five determinants of whistleblowing identified by Near and Miceli (1995). The first determinant is characteristics of the whistleblower. Studies related to this determinant examine whistleblowers’ personality characteristics, moral judgment, and demographic characteristics. Studies related to the second determinant, characteristics of the report recipient, examine characteristics of the individual or individuals who receive the report and characteristics of the reporting channel. The third determinant is characteristics of the wrongdoer. Studies in this area focus on the wrongdoer’s power and credibility. Fourth, accounting studies related to characteristics of the wrongdoing examine factors that affect the dependence of the organization on the wrongdoing and evidence credibility. Studies related to the final determinant, characteristics of the organization, examine organizational perceptions of the appropriateness of whistleblowing, organizational climate, and organizational structure. For each determinant, we first summarize and analyze the findings of prior research, and then we present suggestions for future accounting research in whistleblowing.

SUMMARY: There are many unanswered questions and concerns regarding the consequences of the fraud whistleblowing environment created by the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) and Dodd-Frank Acts. While SOX requires audit committees to implement anonymous internal reporting channels, the Dodd-Frank Act offers substantial monetary incentives that encourage reporting to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). To mitigate concerns that employees might bypass internal channels, some companies are considering offering internal whistleblowing incentives. However, it is unclear how internal incentives will affect employee whistleblowing behavior. We experimentally examine the impact of an internal incentive on employees' intentions to report fraud. Across treatments, we find a greater likelihood of reporting internally than to the SEC. Evidence strength interacts with the presence of an internal incentive such that SEC reporting intentions are greatest when evidence is strong and an internal incentive is present. When evidence is weak, the presence of an internal incentive decreases SEC reporting intentions. Data Availability: Data used in this study are available from the authors upon request.

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This study seeks to identify emotional intelligence (EI) as a key factor in dealing with emotions and pressures in an audit context. In this paper, we focus on how EI may influence the relation between job pressures (i.e., time budget pressure and client pressure) and auditors' judgment. Specifically, we investigate the moderating effect of EI on auditors' third‐person assessments of an auditor's actions when subject to internal and external pressures. The results suggest that the moderating influence of EI can effectively reduce auditors' tendency to engage in dysfunctional behavior and improve audit quality. Further, moderation analysis suggests that EI is a significant mechanism that moderates the effects of different types of pressure on auditors' judgments.

The passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) and Dodd-Frank Acts created a unique environment for whistleblowing at public companies. SOX requires public companies to establish anonymous reporting channels, and Dodd-Frank outlines substantial monetary incentives for reporting securities law violations directly to the SEC. In response to these provisions, this study examines whether the type of securities law violation (fraudulent financial reporting versus insider trading), individuals' psychological assessments of the wrongdoing, and individuals' monetary attitude influence intentions to report to an internal hotline and to the SEC. We find internal reporting is driven by increased perceptions of responsibility to report a wrongful act, whereas external reporting to the SEC is driven by increased perceptions of seriousness regarding the wrongful act. Finally, we find that individuals' attitude toward money explains reporting intentions; however, we do not find any evidence that monetary attitude leads to increased reporting to the SEC. Data Availability: Data used in this study are available from the authors upon request.

Counterproductive behaviors are of concern for all organizations. In addition to explicit financial costs, these behaviors can be detrimental to interpersonal and intraorganizational dynamics and morale, and they can generate negative reputational effects. The accounting literature has long maintained that job autonomy is critical in allowing accountants to apply accounting standards. Prior accounting literature calls for research investigating job autonomy and accounting professionalism. This study answers that call for research. We employ structural equation modeling to evaluate a sample of experienced Chinese accountants from a variety of industries and find a direct, positive, and deleterious effect between job autonomy and counterproductive behaviors. However, this effect is compensated for and reversed by a set of indirect and advantageous effects exerted through the influence of job satisfaction and perceived organizational support.

This paper reports the results of an experiment examining whether estimate source (developed by an external consultant or the audit client) interacts with social pressure (obedience pressure from a superior or conformity pressure from a peer) to influence Chinese auditors' judgments of fair value estimates. The results reveal an interaction between the source of the estimate and the type of social pressure. Specifically, Chinese auditors' risk assessments and judgments regarding whether an auditor will investigate further are not influenced by relevant information about a fair value estimate's source when advised to use a questionable estimate by a superior. However, when the same advice is received from a peer, the likelihood of further investigation and auditors' risk assessments are impacted by the estimate's source.

This study uses an experiment to investigate how an organization's risk appetite statement (conservative versus aggressive) and source of social pressure (conformity pressure from a peer versus obedience pressure from a superior) combine to influence management accountants' aggressive financial reporting behavior. Specifically, we focus on whether social pressure arising from a superior relative to pressure from a peer may undermine a conservative risk appetite. We find that management accountants' aggressive financial reporting judgments are more responsive to obedience pressure relative to conformity pressure in the presence of a conservative risk appetite, which suggests that pressure from a superior may reduce the effectiveness of a conservative risk appetite. Our study contributes to understanding how factors at the individual, social, and organizational level combine to influence management accountants' aggressive financial reporting behavior. Data Availability: The data used in this study are available upon request from the authors.