We review and summarize accounting literature that examines whistleblowing in the accounting context. We organize our review around the five determinants of whistleblowing identified by Near and Miceli (1995). The first determinant is characteristics of the whistleblower. Studies related to this determinant examine whistleblowers’ personality characteristics, moral judgment, and demographic characteristics. Studies related to the second determinant, characteristics of the report recipient, examine characteristics of the individual or individuals who receive the report and characteristics of the reporting channel. The third determinant is characteristics of the wrongdoer. Studies in this area focus on the wrongdoer’s power and credibility. Fourth, accounting studies related to characteristics of the wrongdoing examine factors that affect the dependence of the organization on the wrongdoing and evidence credibility. Studies related to the final determinant, characteristics of the organization, examine organizational perceptions of the appropriateness of whistleblowing, organizational climate, and organizational structure. For each determinant, we first summarize and analyze the findings of prior research, and then we present suggestions for future accounting research in whistleblowing.
SUMMARY:
There are many unanswered questions and concerns regarding the consequences of the fraud whistleblowing environment created by the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) and Dodd-Frank Acts. While SOX requires audit committees to implement anonymous internal reporting channels, the Dodd-Frank Act offers substantial monetary incentives that encourage reporting to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). To mitigate concerns that employees might bypass internal channels, some companies are considering offering internal whistleblowing incentives. However, it is unclear how internal incentives will affect employee whistleblowing behavior. We experimentally examine the impact of an internal incentive on employees' intentions to report fraud. Across treatments, we find a greater likelihood of reporting internally than to the SEC. Evidence strength interacts with the presence of an internal incentive such that SEC reporting intentions are greatest when evidence is strong and an internal incentive is present. When evidence is weak, the presence of an internal incentive decreases SEC reporting intentions.
Data Availability: Data used in this study are available from the authors upon request.
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