The leading edge of the baby boom generation is nearing retirement and facing uncertainty about its need for long-term care (LTC). Using a microsimulation model, this analysis projected that people currently turning age 65 will need LTC for three years on average. An important share of needed care will be covered by public programs and some private insurance, but much of the care will be an uninsured private responsibility of individuals and their families-a responsibility that will be distributed unequally. While over a third of those now turning 65 are projected to never receive family care, three out of 10 will rely on family care for more than two years. Similarly, half of people turning 65 will have no private out-of-pocket expenditures for LTC, while more than one in 20 are projected to spend $100,000 or more of their own money (in present discounted value). Policy debate that focuses only on income security and acute care-and the corresponding Social Security and Medicare programs-misses the third, largely private, risk that retirees face: that of needing LTC.

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Congress enacted legislation in 1990 that dramatically changed the rules for selling supplemental health insurance, or "Medigap" policies, to the elderly. Most notably, policy coverage was standardized. Insurance carriers are allowed to sell only the ten specified packages of benefits, which reduces consumer choice but facilitates comparison shopping. This legislation is important in its own right and also offers lessons for U.S. health care reform. To examine the changes brought about by this legislation and analyze their implications for health care reform, we conducted site visits to nine states and interviewed insurer representatives, executive branch officials, congressional staff, and various interest groups for two years.

Predictors of elderly nursing home admissions were identified using the 1982-1984 National Long-Term Care Survey. The authors found age and health factors were important predictors. Gender was not a significant predictor for disabled elderly admissions when controlling for other variables, even though women constitute the vast majority of nursing home residents. Three of four measures of informal support availability and use were not significantly related to nursing home admission by the disabled. Income and asset wealth were also nonsignificant predictors of institutionalization by the disabled community population.

This paper estimates the ability of the elderly to pay for necessary health care services and emerging technologies. Projections from the Long Term Care Financing Model paint a promising picture of the income and assets that elders in the future will have available to support discretionary, uncovered health care and service costs. Nevertheless, policymakers should pay close attention to the finances of the "Tweeners"--people who are middle class with low levels of discretionary assets available for health and long-term care.

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Provisions in the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) may increase private long-term care insurance sales without imposing substantially more stringent consumer-protection features. The ability of consumers to make informed choices when purchasing this complex product is examined in light of these changes. Data were collected through detailed examinations of policies and interviews with industry experts, insurance companies, agents, consumer groups, and regulators. Because of the complexity of this product, the goals of expanding, consumer choice and ensuring that consumers are able to make informed decisions often work against each other. Mechanisms are discussed through which the government can facilitate informed choice and improve consumer protection. The authors contend that, because the government is providing tax incentives that encourage consumers to purchase the product, it has the responsibility to ensure that consumers understand the long-term care insurance they purchase.

This article uses recent experiences from the Medigap market to draw conclusions about the advisability of alternative methods of regulating the market for long-term care insurance. The analysis is based in part on interviews of state insurance regulators, insurance companies, and interest-group representatives. The authors conclude that some regulation of the market is appropriate, but that the structure and extent of regulation found in the Medigap market would likely be inappropriate for the long-term care insurance market at this time.