People who have not been victimized by negative life events tend to perceive themselves as less vulnerable than others (i.e., as "uniquely invulnerable") to victimization. We examined the conditions under which people's judgments of others' vulnerability differ from judgments of their own vulnerability.In Study 1, subjects saw vague comparison targets (either the "average person" or the "average college student") as more vulnerable than themselves to 10 negative events. In contrast, subjects perceived a specific target (their closest friend, sibling, or same-sex parent) as equally invulnerable as themselves.In Study 2, subjects who were instructed to consider a vague, abstract target (either the "average college student" or "one of your friends") made downward comparisons, choosing a real or hypothetical other who was especially vulnerable to a particular event. On the other hand, subjects who were instructed to consider a specific, concrete target (their closest friend) perceived no self-other differences in risk status. We concluded that when given the opportunity, subjects actively engage in downward comparisons, thereby seeing themselves as relatively invulnerable. Whereas vague targets facilitate downward comparisons, specific targets make such comparisons more difficult. Both cognitive and motivational mechanisms underlying such downward comparisons are discussed.Nonvictims, individuals who have not been victimized by undesirable life events, often underestimate their own personal vulnerability to victimization in relation to other people's vulnerability. In other words, nonvictims appear to have an "illusion of unique invulnerability," in which they see themselves as less vulnerable to victimization than they see most other people (Perloff, 1983). This biased perception is reflected in the common saying, "It won't happen to me," a statement that generally implies that it will happen to others instead. Although many studies have demonstrated the existence of these illusions of unique invulnerability, we still know relatively little about the mediating processes underlying these perceptions. In our two studies, we explore the social comparison processes that nonvictims use when estimating their own and others' risk. Specifically, we examine the conditions under which people's judgments of others' vulnerability differ from judgments of their own vulnerability.Numerous studies have documented the existence of illusions of unique invulnerability among nonvictims. For example, people have judged themselves as less likely than others to be victims of diseases such as cancer, heart attack, pneumonia, alcoholism, and venereal disease (

Individuals who have not been victimized by negative life events, such as serious illness, accidents, or crime, tend to perceive themselves as “uniquely invulnerable,” as less vulnerable to victimization than others. The actual experience of victimization, however, appears to shatter this illusion of invulnerability, creating in victims a new and unfamiliar sense of vulnerability often accompanied by psychological distress. This article reviews literature documenting nonvictims' perceptions of unique invulnerability and victims' heightened perceptions of vulnerability, and addresses the potentially adaptive versus maladaptive consequences of these perceptions. It is argued that victims who have the most difficulty coping with their misfortune may be precisely those individuals who initially felt least vulnerable prior to being victimized. Therefore, how victims cope may depend in part on their prior beliefs about risk. In addition, a distinction is made between victims who feel “uniquely vulnerable” (more vulnerable than others) and those who feel “universally vulnerable” (equally vulnerable as others) to future misfortune. It is proposed that perceptions of universal vulnerability may be a more adaptive reaction to victimization than are perceptions of unique vulnerability.

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As a test of 'control theory', 75 Type A/B undergraduates completed a multidimensional health locus-of-control measure. Type A behaviour correlated significantly with beliefs regarding personal control over health, but not with beliefs regarding chance or powerful others. These findings suggest Type As' desire for control is multidimensional.