Self–other judgments and perceived vulnerability to victimization.

Abstract

People who have not been victimized by negative life events tend to perceive themselves as less vulnerable than others (i.e., as "uniquely invulnerable") to victimization. We examined the conditions under which people's judgments of others' vulnerability differ from judgments of their own vulnerability.In Study 1, subjects saw vague comparison targets (either the "average person" or the "average college student") as more vulnerable than themselves to 10 negative events. In contrast, subjects perceived a specific target (their closest friend, sibling, or same-sex parent) as equally invulnerable as themselves.In Study 2, subjects who were instructed to consider a vague, abstract target (either the "average college student" or "one of your friends") made downward comparisons, choosing a real or hypothetical other who was especially vulnerable to a particular event. On the other hand, subjects who were instructed to consider a specific, concrete target (their closest friend) perceived no self-other differences in risk status. We concluded that when given the opportunity, subjects actively engage in downward comparisons, thereby seeing themselves as relatively invulnerable. Whereas vague targets facilitate downward comparisons, specific targets make such comparisons more difficult. Both cognitive and motivational mechanisms underlying such downward comparisons are discussed.Nonvictims, individuals who have not been victimized by undesirable life events, often underestimate their own personal vulnerability to victimization in relation to other people's vulnerability. In other words, nonvictims appear to have an "illusion of unique invulnerability," in which they see themselves as less vulnerable to victimization than they see most other people (Perloff, 1983). This biased perception is reflected in the common saying, "It won't happen to me," a statement that generally implies that it will happen to others instead. Although many studies have demonstrated the existence of these illusions of unique invulnerability, we still know relatively little about the mediating processes underlying these perceptions. In our two studies, we explore the social comparison processes that nonvictims use when estimating their own and others' risk. Specifically, we examine the conditions under which people's judgments of others' vulnerability differ from judgments of their own vulnerability.Numerous studies have documented the existence of illusions of unique invulnerability among nonvictims. For example, people have judged themselves as less likely than others to be victims of diseases such as cancer, heart attack, pneumonia, alcoholism, and venereal disease (

Social Identity, Availability and the Perception of Risk

“…Nisbett & Ross, 1980 Kelley, 1967, Shaver, 1985. (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), the ease with which information is discounted (Perloff & Fetzer, 1986), the manner in which events are explained (Burger, 1981;Shaver, 1985;Weinstein, 1989) and the nature of social judgment (Markus & Smith, 1981;Rogers, 1981). However, it is important to note two distinctive features of the way in which we are using the concept of self-relevance.…”

Prévention et risques routiers : réguler la peur et/ou la menace

“…D'un côté, les médias contribuent à l'élaboration des représentations sociales qui orientent les comportements. Ils valorisent le spectaculaire, la prise de risque dans le système social ainsi que l'association du plaisir, du pouvoir et de la jeunesse, et favorisent ainsi « l'illusion d'invulnérabilité » (Perloff, Fetzer, 1986). Ils focalisent, selon les périodes, les ressources attentionnelles sur certains objets plutôt que sur d'autres et donc, préférentiellement, sur certains types de risques relativement à d'autres : le chômage et l'insécurité plus que le risque d'accident de la route (agenda setting).…”

Risk perception for acquaintance sexual aggression

“…This is not a blanket optimism-people do believe that bad things happen. Rather, it is an egocentric optimism that "it just won't happen to me" that one's own chances of experiencing health and safety problems are low and certainly lower than their peers' chances of experiencing the same problems (Larwood, 1978;Perloff & Fetzer, 1986;Weinstein, 1980Weinstein, , 1982Weinstein, , 1984Zakay, 1983Zakay, , 1984. Rather than rationally objective perceptions of oneself, the world, and the future, cognitive bias in the form of unrealistic optimism, exaggerated perceptions of personal control, and overly positive self-evaluations are characteristic of normal human thought (Greenwald, 1980;Scheier & Carver, 1985;Taylor & Brown, 1988).…”