Although the use of truth and reconciliation commissions (TRCs) has grown considerably over the last 3 decades, there is still much that we do not know concerning the choice and the structuring of TRCs. While the literature has focused primarily on the effects of TRCs, we examine the domestic and the international factors influencing the choice of a commission in sub-Saharan Africa from 1974 to 2003 using pooled crosssectional time series. We find that states which adopted a TRC prior to South Africa were generally repressive centralized regimes which used the truth commission as political cover. However, since South Africa's TRC, democratizing states have been more likely to adopt a truth commission as a form of transitional justice.Over the past decade, there has been a spirited debate in the literature regarding the relative strengths and weaknesses of various accountability mechanisms for human rights violations. While the 1990s witnessed several important innovations including the establishment of ad hoc international criminal tribunals culminating in the creation of the International Criminal Court (ICC), most accountability methods are domestic responses to human rights abuses. Truth and reconciliation commissions (TRCs) are one of the domestic mechanisms which have received considerable attention from the human rights community as well as intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations over the last 20 years. While much of the literature focuses on the effects of TRCs on democratization, human rights, justice, and reconciliation, there has been considerably less attention paid to the causes of TRCs, namely the political factors which lead states to choose this type of accountability mechanism. Popkin Hum Rights Rev (
The authors apply the theory of collective action and alliance behavior first developed by Olson and Zeckhauser and later extended by Sandler in a series of studies to test whether the nature of refugee protection influences state motivations to provide contributions. The authors investigate whether refugee protection can be viewed as a pure public good with the concomitant problem of free riding leading to suboptimal outcomes or whether contributions provide states private benefits that transform the nature of the good. Using a Heckman selection model, they test for the determinants of state contributions to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and find that refugee protection offers several private benefits, indicating that it is best understood as an impure public good. They conclude, however, that even when states are able to secure these private benefits, it does not necessarily lead to the optimal provision of refugee protection.
This article examines how international institutions serve to diffuse human rights norms and create judicial capacity building in post-conflict societies. Specifically, we examine how the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the Office of the High Representative have influenced the reform of domestic courts in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). We place these reforms within the broader debate over restructuring the complex system of government in BiH. Since 2005, domestic courts in BiH have had jurisdiction over the following: (1) Cases which were initially under the jurisdiction of the domestic courts but remanded to the ICTY and recently returned to BiH. (2) Cases which originated at the ICTY and have been transferred to the State Court, and (3) new cases which originated and remained in the domestic court system. We find that while human rights norms have been incorporated into the new legal code, the diffusion of these human rights norms has been inadequate because of the lack of judicial capacity building. While some courts in the capital enjoy significant resources, the vast majority of cases will be tried at provincial courts which are under-funded and unable to prosecute the significant number of cases. Moreover, the government structure of BiH has had a decidedly negative impact on the prosecution of these cases. Ultimately, the rule of law requires consistency of approach and funding to protect human rights throughout the state.
The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) were established by the United Nations in 1993 and 1994 to apprehend and try individuals suspected of committing war crimes including genocide. The crimes that are prosecuted by these courts are the same, and the structure of the tribunals is also similar (indeed, they both share the same appellate court). However, the mandate of the ICTR is much more narrow and is limited both in terms of the period of time under investigation (one calendar year) as well as being limited to crimes that were committed only in Rwanda. Given the mandate and structure of these tribunals, many question their effectiveness. This article examines these tribunals and measures effectiveness by examining not only the number of indictments that have been handed down but the actual number of individuals apprehended. One of the criticisms of both tribunals is that the lack of success in apprehending suspects diminishes the deterrent effect of the tribunals. Based on a case study of the ICTY and the ITCR, we find that the lack of effective apprehension has reduced the deterrent effect of the tribunals and provided one of the primary justifications for the creation of an international criminal court.
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