Burden Sharing in the Funding of the UNHCR: Refugee Protection as an Impure Public Good

Abstract

The authors apply the theory of collective action and alliance behavior first developed by Olson and Zeckhauser and later extended by Sandler in a series of studies to test whether the nature of refugee protection influences state motivations to provide contributions. The authors investigate whether refugee protection can be viewed as a pure public good with the concomitant problem of free riding leading to suboptimal outcomes or whether contributions provide states private benefits that transform the nature of the good. Using a Heckman selection model, they test for the determinants of state contributions to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and find that refugee protection offers several private benefits, indicating that it is best understood as an impure public good. They conclude, however, that even when states are able to secure these private benefits, it does not necessarily lead to the optimal provision of refugee protection.

States as Gatekeepers in EU Asylum Politics: Explaining the Non‐adoption of a Refugee Quota System

“…This is so both because it is a host state's obligation under international law to process asylum claims made on its territory and because of an inherent threat to security and stability in the host state if there are large numbers of people on its territory deprived of access to any civil or social rights (Betts, , pp. 276–277; Roper and Barria, , p. 624). Based on this power asymmetry, the equilibrium is Co‐operate‐Defect – the host‐state opts for protection whereas the non‐host state defects from co‐operation and refrains from offering responsibility‐sharing.…”

Why Refugee Burden‐Sharing Initiatives Fail: Public Goods, Free‐Riding and Symbolic Solidarity in the EU

“…Burden-sharing discussions that have made references to the particular challenges that the provision of public goods entail have long been prevalent in matters related to 5 The prisoner dilemma points to a constellation where actors who act solely with the aim of maximizing their own individual utility will produce a result which is contrary to their collective interest (Rapoport and Chammah, 1965). international security, defence and peace-keeping, and have also become increasingly important in areas such as climate change and refugee protection (Betts, 2003;Olson and Zeckhauser, 1966;Oneal, 1990aOneal, , 1990bRoper and Barria, 2010;Sandler, 1992Sandler, , 2004Suhrke, 1998;Thielemann and Dewan, 2006). While references to the public goods concept in the discussion of refugee policy are therefore not new, much of that literature has remained somewhat vague as to what the public goods are that refugee protection efforts are expected to provide.…”

Asylum Policy in the EU: the Case for Deeper Integration

“…But one strand addresses the question of whether there is anything to be gained by closer cooperation among destination countries, particularly those in the EU, where joint policy is feasible (Suhrke 1998, Betts, 2003Hatton 2004Hatton , 2011Thielemann 2005Thielemann , 2006Thielemann and Derwan 2006;Czaika, 2009;Roper and Barria, 2010). The sources of possible gains to cooperation that are cited include reducing costs and uncertainty, minimising the deflection of asylum applicants from one destination to another, preserving international security, and the honouring international obligations such as the 1951 Refugee Convention.…”