The article is devoted to the US foreign policy during one of the most acute crises of the Cold War period. The issue of the Eisenhower administration's choice of a strategy of deterrence and non-interference in the military action of NATO allies is debatable and relevant as a historical experience in the development of geostrategic guidelines in the US foreign policy strategy. The purpose of the article is to identify the main risks and opening prospects for the United States in the choice of foreign policy strategy in the Middle East in the context of the development of the Suez crisis. The methodological basis of the study is the historical-genetic, historical-comparative, historical-typological methods. It has been established that the reasons that prompted the United States to form an appropriate strategy included geopolitical and economic motives: the desire to take a leading position in the Middle East, demonstrating an alternative to Great Britain and France; the desire to win the trust of Egypt, which has the potential of a leader in the region and military-strategic contacts with the USSR; readiness to join economic sanctions against Egypt with the potential to receive economic and political dividends and competitive advantages; preference to keep the possibility of balancing between the sides in the Arab-Israeli confrontation. The author comes to the conclusion that during the Suez crisis of 1956, the United States acted rationally, but in the conditions of the current moment.
The author considers the problem of the role of Egypt in the US policy in the Middle East in the early 1950s. It is shown that a new political circumstances in the regions of the Middle and Near East forced the United States to act as a competitor to Great Britain. The United States understood the importance of gradually ousting Great Britain from the region, trying to prevent the increase of Soviet influence there using various methods. At the same time, the implementation of US's plan to form a controlled military-political bloc of Middle Eastern states in 1950-1953 proved to be untenable for various reasons. The decisive role in this regard was played by the position held by Egypt. A special contribution of the authors to the study of the topic is the focus on the project "Middle East Command", as the first failed plan of the military bloc of Western countries in the region. It was revealed that the US stake on Egypt as a conductor of its interests turned out to be unjustified. The US administration objectively saw in the anti-British movement, which was gaining momentum in Egypt during this period, an opportunity to strengthen its influence. However, with the approval of G. A. Nasser in power in Egypt, a new foreign policy strategy was being developed, which was based on efforts to raise the patriotism of the Arab countries and unite the Arabs in the fight against the colonial past. Also, US's efforts to achieve coexistence of Egypt and Israel in a single policy not brought the desired results. In the context of the unresolved Palestinian issue and the aggravation of the Arab-Israeli confrontation in Egypt's foreign policy, tendencies towards rapprochement with the Arab countries in the form of a number of military-political alliances were gaining momentum.
В статье исследуются особенности формирования позиции США накануне англо-франко-израильской военной операции против Египта. В год 65-летия Суэцкого кризиса остается в высокой степени актуальным вопрос выработки Соединенными Штатами внешнеполитических стратегических решений в условиях нарастания конфликтности на Ближнем Востоке. Автор выделяет основные причины отказа США поддержать Великобританию и Францию в военной акции против Египта. В статье отмечается ряд негативных последствий для США, которые нес в себе период выстраивания совместной политики с Великобританией и Францией в отношении Египта. Попытки политического и экономического подчинения Египта осуществлялись посредством египетско-израильского сближения, предоставления кредита на строительство Асуанской плотины, включения Египта в инициируемый странами Запада военно-политический блок, что в итоге стимулировало активизацию антизападных настроений во внутренней и внешней политике Г. А. Насера. Основными последствиями этого стали Чехословацкая сделка и национализация Суэцкого канала. Смелые действия лидера Египта как прецедент для всего арабского мира требовали от западных стран жесткой реакции. Выделяются основные аргументы администрации США в пользу отклонения военного сценария, указываются расхождения между США и западноевропейскими лидерами по вопросу о привлечении Израиля в конфликт, что связывалось с ростом авторитета президента Египта в арабском мире. США продемонстрировали отказ от совместной политики с союзниками по НАТО в случае, когда сложившая ситуация напрямую не угрожала их стратегическим интересам в регионе и, более того, препятствовала реализации долгосрочных задач на Ближнем Востоке. The article investigates the formation of the US attitude to a military operation against Egypt on the eve of the Anglo-French-Israeli military operation against Egypt. Now when the world is commemorating the 65th anniversary of the Suez crisis, the issue of the United States working out strategic foreign policy decisions in the context of the growing conflict in the Middle East remains highly relevant. The author highlights the main reasons for the US refusal to support Britain and France in the military action against Egypt. The article underlines a number of negative consequences the United States brought about by joint actions of the USA, Great Britain and France in Egypt. Egyptian-Israeli rapprochement, the provision of a loan for the construction of the Aswan Dam, and the inclusion of Egypt in the military-political bloc initiated by the Western countries were associated with an attempt to rob Egypt of its political and economic independence. These developments resulted in anti-Western sentiments in Egypt’s domestic and foreign policy during the Nasser period, the main consequences being the Czechoslovak arms deal and the nationalization of the Suez Canal. The bold actions of the Egyptian leader as a precedent for the entire Arab world demanded a tough reaction from Western countries. The author highlights the main arguments of the US administration in favor of abandoning the military scenario. The author says that the USA and Western Europe had different views on whether or not to involve Israel, which is accounted for by the growing influence of the Egyptian president in the Arab world. The USA abstained from cooperating with NATO in what might threaten the strategic interests of the country in the region and hinder its long-term agenda in the Middle East.
The authors consider the problem of the significance of Egypt's policy in the context of the transformation of the US geostrategic approaches in the Middle East in 1953–1956. It is shown that the approaches of the United States that have undergone transformation, which sought to create a controlled military-political bloc of the states of the Middle East region, were not implemented largely due to the policy of Egypt. Continuing the implementation of the military-political project - the Baghdad Pact, Washington not only did not achieve the favor of Cairo, but also caused its extremely negative reaction, which became a derivative of the understanding that American initiatives were an attempt to strengthen Egypt's traditional rival in the struggle for leadership in the Arab world – Iraq. A special contribution of the authors to the study of the topic is the designation of the role of Egypt as a regional power capable of creating alternative military projects to American initiatives. The circumstances preventing the inclusion of Cairo in the military-political bloc of states in the Middle East initiated by the United States, which directed a number of Arab countries against such initiatives, sympathizing with the anti-colonial sentiments of the Egyptian leadership, are indicated. It was revealed that the persistence of the initiatives of the Western states and the methods of their implementation prompted Cairo to seek protection in the face of an alternative center of power. Therefore, in the conditions of aggravation of Egyptian-Israeli relations on the eve of the Suez crisis, Egypt is drawing closer to the USSR. However, Washington retained the possibility of rapprochement with Cairo, not formally becoming a member of the Baghdad Pact, and also «staying aside» in the military anti-Egyptian action of Great Britain, France and Israel.
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