The Suez Crisis in the US Foreign Policy Strategy in the Middle East: Risks and Prospects.

Abstract

The article is devoted to the US foreign policy during one of the most acute crises of the Cold War period. The issue of the Eisenhower administration's choice of a strategy of deterrence and non-interference in the military action of NATO allies is debatable and relevant as a historical experience in the development of geostrategic guidelines in the US foreign policy strategy. The purpose of the article is to identify the main risks and opening prospects for the United States in the choice of foreign policy strategy in the Middle East in the context of the development of the Suez crisis. The methodological basis of the study is the historical-genetic, historical-comparative, historical-typological methods. It has been established that the reasons that prompted the United States to form an appropriate strategy included geopolitical and economic motives: the desire to take a leading position in the Middle East, demonstrating an alternative to Great Britain and France; the desire to win the trust of Egypt, which has the potential of a leader in the region and military-strategic contacts with the USSR; readiness to join economic sanctions against Egypt with the potential to receive economic and political dividends and competitive advantages; preference to keep the possibility of balancing between the sides in the Arab-Israeli confrontation. The author comes to the conclusion that during the Suez crisis of 1956, the United States acted rationally, but in the conditions of the current moment.