This paper estimated the effects of tort law and insurer investment returns on physician malpractice insurance premiums. Data were collected on tort law from 1991 through 2004, and multivariate regression models, including fixed effects for state and year, were used to estimate the effect of changes in tort law on medical malpractice premiums. The premium consequences of national policy changes were simulated. The analysis found that the introduction of a new damage cap lowered malpractice premiums for internal medicine, general surgery, and obstetrics/gynecology by 17.3%, 20.7%, and 25.5%, respectively. Lowering damage caps by $100,000 reduced premiums by 4%. Statutes of repose also resulted in lower premiums. No other tort law changes had the effect of lowering premiums. Simulation results indicate that a national cap of $250,000 on awards for noneconomic damages in all states would imply premium savings of $16.9 billion. Extending a $250,000 cap to all states that do not currently have them would save $1.4 billion annually, or about 8% of the total. A negative effect on malpractice premiums was found for the Dow Jones industrial average, but not for bond prices; effects of the Nasdaq index were not significant for internal medicine, but were marginally significant for surgery and obstetrics premiums.

Using a panel study design, we examined the effects of different types of texting bans on motor vehicular fatalities. We used the Fatality Analysis Reporting System and a difference-in-differences approach to examine the incidence of fatal crashes in 2000 through 2010 in 48 US states with and without texting bans. Age cohorts were constructed to examine the impact of these bans on age-specific traffic fatalities. Primarily enforced laws banning all drivers from texting were significantly associated with a 3% reduction in traffic fatalities in all age groups, and those banning only young drivers from texting had the greatest impact on reducing deaths among those aged 15 to 21 years. Secondarily enforced restrictions were not associated with traffic fatality reductions in any of our analyses.

This article reviews the empirical literature on the effects of damages caps and concludes that the better-designed studies show that damages caps reduce liability insurance premiums. The effects of damages caps on defensive medicine, physicians' location decisions, and the cost of health care to consumers are less clear. The only study of whether consumers benefit from lower health insurance premiums as a result of damages caps found no impact. Some state courts have based decisions declaring damages caps legislation unconstitutional on the lack of evidence of their effectiveness, thereby ignoring the findings of conflicting research studies or discounting their relevance. Although courts should be cautious in rejecting empirical evidence that caps are effective, legislators should consider whether they benefit consumers enough to justify limiting tort recoveries for those most seriously injured by malpractice.

We used a panel design and the Nationwide Inpatient Sample from 19 states between 2003 and 2010 to examine the impact of texting bans on crash-related hospitalizations. We conducted conditional negative binomial regressions with state, year, and month fixed effects to examine changes in crash-related hospitalizations in states after the enactment of a texting ban relative to those in states without such bans. Results indicate that texting bans were associated with a 7% reduction in crash-related hospitalizations among all age groups. Texting bans were significantly associated with reductions in hospitalizations among those aged 22 to 64 years and those aged 65 years or older. Marginal reductions were seen among adolescents. States that have not passed strict texting bans should consider doing so.

Objective. Tort reform may affect health insurance premiums both by reducing medical malpractice premiums and by reducing the extent of defensive medicine. The objective of this study is to estimate the effects of noneconomic damage caps on the premiums for employer‐sponsored health insurance. Data Sources/Study Setting. Employer premium data and plan/establishment characteristics were obtained from the 1999 through 2004 Kaiser/HRET Employer Health Insurance Surveys. Damage caps were obtained and dated based on state annotated codes, statutes, and judicial decisions. Study Design. Fixed effects regression models were run to estimate the effects of the size of inflation‐adjusted damage caps on the weighted average single premiums. Data Collection/Extraction Methods. State tort reform laws were identified using Westlaw, LEXIS, and statutory compilations. Legislative repeal and amendment of statutes and court decisions resulting in the overturning or repealing state statutes were also identified using LEXIS. Principal Findings. Using a variety of empirical specifications, there was no statistically significant evidence that noneconomic damage caps exerted any meaningful influence on the cost of employer‐sponsored health insurance. Conclusions. The findings suggest that tort reforms have not translated into insurance savings.

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