A dummy traffic strategy is described that can be implemented by mix nodes in an anonymous communication network to detect and counter active (n − 1) attacks and their variants. Heartbeat messages are sent anonymously from the mix node back to itself in order to establish its state of connectivity with the rest of the network. In case the mix is under attack, the flow of heartbeat messages is interrupted and the mix takes measures to preserve the quality of the anonymity it provides by introducing decoy messages.
In recent years, there have been several proposals for anonymous communication systems that provide intentional weaknesses to allow anonymity to be circumvented in special cases. These anonymity revocation schemes attempt to retain the properties of strong anonymity systems while granting a special class of people the ability to selectively break through their protections. We evaluate the two dominant classes of anonymity revocation systems, and identify fundamental flaws in their architecture, leading to a failure to ensure proper anonymity revocation, as well as introducing additional weaknesses for users not targeted for anonymity revocation.
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