Comparison Between Two Practical Mix Designs

Díaz, Claudia; Sassaman, Len; Dewitte, Evelyne

doi:10.1007/978-3-540-30108-0_9

Cited by 29 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 11 publications

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“…Other works have considered the timing characteristics of Tor and other anonymity networks in the context of timing attacks on anonymity (Danezis, 2004;Diaz et al, 2004;Shmatikov and Wang, 2006;Murdoch and Watson, 2008).…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Leaving timing-channel fingerprints in hidden service log files

Shebaro

Pérez-González

Crandall

2010

Digital Investigation

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Fingerprints Tor networkHidden services Timestamps a b s t r a c t Hidden services are anonymously hosted services that can be accessed over an anonymity network, such as Tor. While most hidden services are legitimate, some host illegal content.There has been a fair amount of research on locating hidden services, but an open problem is to develop a general method to prove that a physical machine, once confiscated, was in fact the machine that had been hosting the illegal content. In this paper we assume that the hidden service logs requests with some timestamp, and give experimental results for leaving an identifiable fingerprint in this log file as a timing channel that can be recovered from the timestamps. In 60 min, we are able to leave a 36-bit fingerprint that can be reliably recovered. The main challenges are the packet delays caused by the anonymity network that requests are sent over and the existing traffic in the log from the actual clients accessing the service. We give data to characterize these noise sources and then describe an implementation of timing-channel fingerprinting for an Apache web server based hidden service on the Tor network, where the fingerprint is an additive channel that is superencoded with a ReedeSolomon code for reliable recovery. Finally, we discuss the inherent tradeoffs and possible approaches to making the fingerprint more stealthy.

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Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Leaving timing-channel fingerprints in hidden service log files

Shebaro

Pérez-González

Crandall

2010

Digital Investigation

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“…The social class is inextricably involved with the model and abstract classes in the measurement framework of all three domains. In political science, there is a somewhat pervasive antagonism toward rationalizing power (Diaz et al 2004).…”

Section: Foundations In Systems Integrationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Engineering Systems Integration

Langford¹

2016

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Systems engineering is the glue that holds together complex creations and enables them to perform beneficial functions. The current demand for systems engineers outpaces all but a very few other fields, and Gary Langford is eminently qualified to inform those who seek to work or want to work effectively in this crucial endeavor.Engineering Systems Integration: Theory, Metrics, and Methods fills a glaring gap faced when we consider and then carry out systems integration. This book offers a sound approach to planning for systems integration. It treats integration as a fundamental approach based on common-sense rationale. The activities of integration are discussed in a clear and straightforward manner.Gary Langford brings his practical experience in integrating large and small systems to a wide audience in different fields and disciplines. He has woven considerable technical skills honed in industry with the right blend of academics to deliver a much needed and most readable textbook. There is a great need for this book.

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“…Continuous mixes were also implemented (with some modifications) with the name 'Reliable' as part of the Mixmaster network, where they interoperated with the Mixmaster pool mixes. Several vulnerabilities of the deployed 'Reliable' were pointed out by Diaz et al, who also showed that they did not guarantee any minimum level of anonymity in practice given low traffic levels [25].…”

Section: High-latency Acssmentioning

confidence: 99%

Optimizing the design parameters of threshold pool mixes for anonymity and delay

et al. 2014

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The provision of content confidentiality via message encryption is by no means sufficient when facing the significant privacy risks present in online communications. Indeed, the privacy literature abounds with examples of traffic analysis techniques aimed to reveal a great deal of information, merely from the knowledge, even if probabilistic, of who is communicating with whom, when, and how frequently. Anonymous-communication systems emerge as a response against such traffic analysis threats. Mixes, and in particular threshold pool mixes, are a building block of anonymous communications systems. These are nodes that receive, store, reorder and delay messages in batches. However, the anonymity gained from the statistical difficulty to link incoming and outgoing messages comes at the expense of introducing a potentially costly delay in the delivery of those messages.Postprint (published version

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Comparison Between Two Practical Mix Designs

Cited by 29 publications

References 11 publications

Leaving timing-channel fingerprints in hidden service log files

Leaving timing-channel fingerprints in hidden service log files

Engineering Systems Integration

Optimizing the design parameters of threshold pool mixes for anonymity and delay

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