The view that emotional intelligence should be included within the traditional cognitive abilities framework was explored in 3 studies (total N = 530) by investigating the relations among measures of emotional intelligence, traditional human cognitive abilities, and personality. The studies suggest that the status of the emotional intelligence construct is limited by measurement properties of its tests. Measures based on consensual scoring exhibited low reliability. Self-report measures had salient loadings on well-established personality factors, indicating a lack of divergent validity. These data provide controvertible evidence for the existence of a separate Emotion Perception factor that (perhaps) represents the ability to monitor another individual's emotions. This factor is narrower than that postulated within current models of emotional intelligence.There have been several recent attempts to incorporate emotional intelligence within the broad framework provided by theories of human cognitive abilities

Generally, self-assessment of accuracy in the cognitive domain produces overconfidence, whereas self-assessment of visual perceptual judgments results in underconfidence. Despite contrary empirical evidence, in models attempting to explain those phenomena, individual differences have often been disregarded. The authors report on 2 studies in which that shortcoming was addressed. In Experiment 1, participants (N= 520) completed a large number of cognitive-ability tests. Results indicated that individual differences provide a meaningful source of overconfidence and that a metacognitive trait might mediate that effect. In further analysis, there was only a relatively small correlation between test accuracy and confidence bias. In Experiment 2 (N = 107 participants), both perceptual and cognitive ability tests were included, along with measures of personality. Results again indicated the presence of a confidence factor that transcended the nature of the testing vehicle. Furthermore, a small relationship was found between that factor and some self-reported personality measures. Thus, personality traits and cognitive ability appeared to play only a small role in determining the accuracy of self-assessment. Collectively, the present results suggest that there are multiple causes of miscalibration, which current models of over- and underconfidence fail to encompass.

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SELF-CONFIDENCE AND METACOGNITIVE PROCESSES Sabina Kleitman * and Lazar StankovSchool of Psychology, The University of SydneyAbstract. This paper examines the status of Self-confidence trait. Two studies strongly suggest that Self-confidence is a component of metacognition. In the first study, participants (N=132) were administered measures of Self-concept, a newly devised Memory and Reasoning Competence Inventory (MARCI), and a Verbal Reasoning Test (VRT). The results indicate a significant relationship between confidence ratings on the VRT and the Reasoning component of MARCI. The second study (N=296) employed an extensive battery of cognitive tests and several metacognitive measures. Results indicate the presence of robust Selfconfidence and Metacognitive Awareness factors, and a significant correlation between them. Self-confidence taps not only processes linked to performance on items that have correct answers, but also beliefs about events that may never occur. Key words: Confidence ratings, Metacognition, Self-confidence, Metacognitive Self-monitoring.This paper examines the relationship between Self-confidence measured during performance on typical cognitive tests and several conceptually related constructs. These latter constructs include problem-solving strategies, broad self-concepts, metacognitive awareness, and beliefs about occurrences of some future events. The aim is to further our understanding of Self-confidence and establish its status within the taxonomy of cognitive/metacognitive processes. The Self-confidence FactorOur procedure for the assessment of Self-confidence is integrated within the typical test-taking activity. Immediately after responding to an item in a test, participants are asked to give a rating indicating how confident they are that the chosen answer is correct. Confidence is usually expressed in terms of percentages. The confidence ratings for all attempted test items are averaged to give an overall confidence score. *

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ABSTRACT-Recurrent features of the thinking pattern (or mindset) of violent militant extremists are delineated, discussed, and related to previous research and theory. We examined extremist groups from a diverse range of continents, cultures, and political and religious orientations. We compared statements by (and, to some degree, statements about) these groups and formulated 16 themes common to the militant-extremist mindset. Among these themes are perceptions of a crisis involving violations of posited sacred values, along with justifications for the use of violence to remediate such problems. There are indications that such themes are not infrequent in the general population. For example, research participants failed to strongly disassociate themselves from the sentiments and framings found in the fanatical items, which undercuts the notion that militant-extremist thinking represents bizarre ideation. Militantextremist thinking appears to represent a major, aggressive form of fanaticism affected by both dispositional and situational factors. Key themes in this thinking pattern might fit together to construct a potentially compelling narrative, which may be a key part of the ideological appeal of salient militant-extremist groups. -Hoffer (1951, p. 86) Violence in the contemporary world is a major source of societal instability as well as individual stress and trauma. It also imposes economic costs. Much of the violence is, of course, conventionally criminal and is based on personal and instrumental motives. But sometimes violence is based on closely held sacred values and involves a significant ideological (i.e., political and/or religious) basis. Ideology-inspired violence, including those acts carried out by militant-extremist individuals and groups, has psychological dimensions. Perspectives in Psychological Science -May 2009 -In PressMost people find extremist behavior and thinking difficult to comprehend, as exemplified in the bewilderment felt by Americans on and after September 11, 2001, when many tried to make sense of the motivations of those who carried out attacks on targets in New York and Washington. Understanding of the militant-extremist mindset will help increase our understanding of the thinking and motivation of known militant-extremist groups. It will facilitate prediction of which groups are most likely to be violence-prone, by enabling one to gauge their fit to the prototypical tendencies of militant extremism. We may learn that populations sometimes condone militant extremists because they may share, in part, the same mindset. And this understanding can contribute to broader psychological theory regarding ideology and ideology-driven aggression. Perspectives in Psychological Science -May 2009 -In PressMilitant extremism can be defined as zealous adherence to a set of beliefs and values, with a combination of two key features: advocacy of measures beyond the norm (i.e., extremism) and intention and willingness to resort to violence (i.e., militancy). Of most interest, of course, is vi...