Decision-making, Contraception, Gender, Uganda, Multi-level, Community,

While lower fertility is commonly associated with women's reproductive autonomy, we demonstrate that the influence of men's education on reproductive decision-making increased during the first decade of rapid fertility decline in Ghana. Husband's education exerts a stronger influence on wife's fertility intentions than does her own education, and the magnitude of the effect of his education increased significantly from 1988 to 1998. Lower fertility in Ghana seems to be associated more with men's declining fertility desires than with women's increasing reproductive autonomy. Nevertheless, there is some indication that women's education may play a relatively greater role in reproductive decision-making as fertility decline progresses still further.

The literature on gender differentials in nutrition demonstrates that the calorie intake of females is generally as adequate as that of males at all ages. Female disadvantage in micronutrient intake is, however, frequent. Pregnant and lactating women are disadvantaged relative to both men and other women. In South Asia there is evidence that boys are advantaged over girls in food intake at some ages, but the evidence for male advantage in access to health care is far stronger. The authors argue that nutrition interventions are best targeted when the incidence of female disadvantage is better understood and, similarly, that interventions to improve women's status should be focused on objectives other than calorie intake in most communities. However, standards for measuring adequacy incorporate norms for female body size and physical activity that may uncritically accept the notion that females are more physically passive. Maintaining adequacy by these standards could perpetuate low levels of female functioning. Copyright 2000 by The Population Council, Inc..

Ghanaian fertility decline may not be associated with women's having greater control over reproduction. Focus groups of young Ghanaian men and women indicate that attitudes supporting men's dominance in fertility decisions characterize even the highly educated. Young women with high fertility desires anticipate being able to stop childbearing when they want to, but they do not expect to be able to continue if their husband wants to stop. Those with low fertility desires do not anticipate being able to stop without husband consent, but they envision support for continuing childbearing. Women's expected influence appears limited to situations where their fertility desires conform to normative expectations.

Partner discussion does not necessarily mean an increase in knowledge of a partner's contraceptive attitudes. Therefore, anticipated reductions in unmet need for contraception through improvements in spousal discussion may be overstated.

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In many areas throughout sub-Saharan Africa, young adult cohorts are less educated than their predecessors because of declines in school enrollments during the 1980s and 1990s. Because a woman with little education typically becomes a mother earlier and has more children than one with better education, and because of a similar well-established relationship between current education and current fertility at the societal level, one might expect such education reversals to raise fertility. However, if there is an additional negative effect of low educational level among currently young women compared with that in the past, which would accord with ideas about the impact of relative deprivation, the total effect of an education reversal may run in either direction. This possibility has not been explored in earlier studies, which have taken a more static approach. We focus on the initiation of childbearing. Using Demographic and Health Survey data from 16 sub-Saharan African countries with multiple surveys, we estimate a fixed-effects multilevel model for first births that includes the woman's own education, community education, and community education relative to the past. There are negative effects of individual and community education, but no effect of relative education. Thus we conclude that education reversals do seem to speed up entry into parenthood.

Children seem to present a barrier to the gender revolution in that parents are more likely to divide paid and domestic work along traditional gender lines than childless couples are. However, the extent to which this is so varies between countries and over time. We used data on 35 countries from the 2012 International Social Survey Programme to identify the contexts in which parents and non-parents differ the most in their division of labour. In Central/South America, Eastern Europe, Southern Europe, Asia, and South Africa, labour sharing configurations did not vary as much with the presence of children as in Australia, Western Europe, North America, and Northern Europe. Our multilevel models helped explain this pattern by showing that children seem to present a greater barrier to the gender revolution in richer and, surprisingly, more gender equal countries. However, the relationship between children and couples' division of labour can be thought of as curvilinear, first increasing as societies progress, but then weakening if societies respond with policies that promote men's involvement at home. In particular, having a portion of parental leave reserved for fathers reduces the extent to which children are associated with traditional labour sharing in the domestic sphere.